Efforts to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability appeared to have entered a new phase in early February 2006 with the adoption of a resolution by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors that reports the issue to the United Nations Security Council.

In its key paragraphs, the resolution “expresses serious concern” regarding the lack of clarification of certain aspects of Iran’s nuclear program; “deeply regrets” Iran’s resumption of uranium conversion and enrichment-related activities; and “calls on Iran to understand that there is a lack of confidence in Iran’s intentions in seeking a fissile material production capability against the background of Iran’s record on safeguards...” [1] (The last point is a reference to the fact that, for eighteen years, Iran failed to declare to the IAEA a number of activities involving the possession and processing of uranium, whose disclosure was required by Iran’s inspection agreement with the Agency.) The resolution was passed by the 35 member states of the IAEA Board of Governors by a vote of 27 in favor, 3 against, with 5 abstentions. The passage of this resolution by such a wide margin suggests that the international community is increasingly united in its suspicions regarding Iran’s nuclear aspirations, particularly when compared with the previous Board resolution of September 24, 2005, which did not enjoy the support of key Board members.

See the table below for the comparative voting results on Iran by the IAEA Board of Governors (BoG).

Major Power Solidarity
Much of the attention to the February 4, 2006, vote has focused on the fact that the resolution had the support of Russia and China, thereby providing consensus regarding Iran among the five permanent members of the Security Council. At the same time, another significant change in the dynamic of the Board vote appears to be the widening split among the states of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), with a growing number of Board of Governors members from this bloc voting to increase pressure on Tehran.

As with the previous resolution, the drafters had sufficient votes to pass the resolution with a simple majority. The resolution not only had the support of U.S. and European Union Board members, but all other Western Group states, as well, including Australia, Canada, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

The additional support of China and Russia was significant in light of the resolution’s obligation to report the issue to the Security Council. However, both states agreed to the resolution on the condition that no action be taken in the Security Council until IAEA Director-General Mohammed ElBaradei delivers a comprehensive report on Iran to the March 6 IAEA Board meeting. Since the February 4 vote, China has declared that it hopes to continue negotiations in the framework of the IAEA, and Russian President Vladimir Putin has also stressed that the resolution provides for “joint work” between the Security Council and the IAEA rather than a referral to the former. [2] [3]

NAM Joint Statement – and Defections
With Iran a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, politics among the NAM members of the Board of Governors were no less complex than among the major powers. While the NAM members of the Board cannot “make or break” a Board decision individually, as a voting bloc NAM states account for nearly half of the 35-member Board this year. The Movement has formulated fundamental common positions on the issue of nuclear weapons, which hinge primarily on the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and, as highlighted in the NAM joint statement to the Board in the context of the February 4 vote, on protecting the “basic and inalienable right of all Member States, as stipulated in the Statute of the IAEA, to develop research, production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, without any discrimination and in conformity with their respective legal obligations.” [4]

Despite this joint statement by the NAM, which suggests a defense of Iran’s assertion that its own program is solely for peaceful purposes and that it has the legal right to pursue this program, the NAM did not vote as a bloc – and most NAM Board members did not vote to support Iran. The divisions among the NAM were already evident during the vote in September, but to a lesser degree; most NAM Board members abstained on the September resolution, with a small group voting in favor and one opposed. In February however, the NAM was balance had shifted, with half of the NAM voting in favor of the resolution and the other half divided between five abstentions and three opposed. While the NAM has previously sheltered Iran from harsher resolutions in the IAEA Board, it appears that a large segment of this bloc is increasingly willing to join the rest of the international community to exert pressure on one of its own members. This apparent re-alignment of the Non-Aligned, however, is due to a number of factors, which vary among states and regions.

India Stays Aligned with the United States
India’s vote in favor of the resolution was as expected, given its support for the September 24 resolution, which declared Iran to be in non-compliance with its obligations to place all of its nuclear materials under IAEA monitoring, as required by its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. In comments to the press, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh declared that India’s February 4 vote was based on its “enlightened national interest,” adding that, as a member of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran must abide by its international commitments. [5] Part of India’s national interest, Singh strongly implied, lies in maintaining conditions that will support a pending U.S.-India nuclear trade agreement, announced by Singh and U.S. President George W. Bush on July 18, 2005. In a comment on January 25, 2006, U.S. Ambassador to India David Mulford suggested that if India decided not to vote in favor of the February resolution, “the effect on members of the U.S. Congress with regard to the [Indo-U.S.] civil nuclear initiative will be devastating.” [6] In addition, frustration appears to be growing within India regarding Iran’s behavior, and Indian editorials highlighted the fact that all of the major powers, not just the United States, are seriously concerned with Iran’s nuclear intentions. [7]

Such suspicions are not shared by India’s Left parties, however, which have been highly critical of India’s votes to declare Iran in non-compliance with its IAEA obligations and to report Iran to the Security Council. These parties have demanded a full parliamentary debate on the issue. [8] Moreover, there are also concerns within India regarding the effect of India’s vote on its energy security, as Iran has threatened to link an agreement on the sale of natural gas to India’s vote in the IAEA Board. [9] Following the February vote however, Iran appeared to ease its position somewhat, asserting that the vote will not affect bilateral relations with key partners, including India. [10]

Like India, a number of other NAM states, namely Ecuador, Ghana, and Singapore, voted to both declare Iran in non-compliance and report the issue to the Security Council.

Support for the Resolution from Arab States
Two of the NAM states voting in favor of the resolution were Arab states: Yemen and Egypt. Yemen previously abstained on the September 2005 resolution finding Iran in non-compliance with its IAEA commitments. As a Gulf state however, Yemen’s change in position against Iran is likely due to shared concerns with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which has described Iran’s nuclear program as “worrisome for the region and a fundamental concern for all the countries of the world.” [11]

As a regional power wary of a rising Iran, Egypt can be expected to share similar concerns. Egypt also used the resolution to continue its push for a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East, a position which, while pertinent to Iran’s aspirations, is largely aimed at eliminating Israel’s nuclear arsenal. Egypt therefore supported the inclusion of a preambular paragraph in the resolution that recognizes that resolving the Iranian issue “would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery.” [12] In line with other NAM states, as well as Russia and China, Egypt also declared that its vote was predicated on the understanding that no action should be taken at the UN Security Council until the delivery of El
Baradei’s March report to the IAEA Board. [13]

Key NAM States Remain in the Middle
While NAM members of the Board increasingly gravitated toward moving the Iran matter to the Security Council, key NAM members remained on the fence. Of particular interest is South Africa’s decision to abstain on the February 4 vote, as it had on the September 24 ballot, notwithstanding lobbying by both the West and Iran. [14] This lobbying reflects South Africa’s credibility on the issue of nuclear nonproliferation as a state that dismantled its own nuclear arsenal in the early 1990s and that has become a strong proponent of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, acting as a leading member of both the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) and the NAM. (The New Agenda Coalition is a political bloc, formed in the context of the NPT, which also includes Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden.

According to the statement delivered to the IAEA Board by South Africa’s representative Ambassador Abdul Samad Minty, South Africa chose to abstain on the February 4 resolution for two reasons. First, South Africa expressed its concern about marginalizing the role of the IAEA in resolving the issue, stating that, “This resolution seeks to initiate a process whereby the Security Council will become more substantially involved in the Agency’s verification activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, with a diminishing and possibly subservient and even marginal role for the Board.” Second, South Africa expressed its reservation about adopting a decision on the matter without a full Board consensus. According to Ambassador Minty, “South Africa has, as always, worked for the adoption of consensus decisions by the Board on the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Echoing the sentiments of Russia and China, Ambassador Minty cited the lack of consensus on the formulation of the resolution, adding that consensus could have been possible if the action had been deferred to March. [15]

External political concerns also likely influenced South Africa’s decision. Failing to take a stand against Iran, in light of Iran’s failure to explain a number of actions and cooperate with the international community, could have diminished South Africa’s credibility in the eyes of the major powers. On the other hand, if South Africa voted for the resolution, it could have been seen by the NAM as “abandoning its constituency and siding with the West.” [16] As a member of the NAM troika, which consists of the former, present, and future chairs of the NAM (South Africa, Malaysia, and Cuba respectively), South Africa was under particular political pressure to defend a NAM member. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki met with the Foreign Ministers of the NAM troika in South Africa to gain their support prior to the February Board meeting. [17] During this visit, the four Foreign Ministers issued a joint statement on Iran’s nuclear program, which included the traditional NAM position: “reaffirming the basic and inalienable right of all States Parties to the NPT to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes…” [18] With the NAM split mostly in favor of the resolution, and Cuba, the future NAM chair, opposed, South Africa’s abstention decision essentially placed it in the middle, avoiding offense to both proponents and opponents of the February 4 resolution. After the resolution was adopted however, South African Foreign Minister Nkosasana Dlamini-Zuma called the decision to report the issue to the Security Council “a regrettable turn of events,” and again urged states to wait to take action until ElBaradei delivered his report in March. [19]

Indonesia was another key NAM member that voted to abstain. According to Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Hassan Wirajuda, Jakarta agreed that Iran needed to provide the international community with greater confidence in its intentions, but disagreed with reporting the matter to the Security Council, and therefore abstained. This position however, received significant criticism from members of the Indonesian parliament who insisted that the abstention contradicted the previous position of the Indonesian government, which supported Iran’s right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. [20]

In addition to such domestic political considerations, which may have discouraged the Indonesian government from supporting the February resolution, Indonesia’s position may also have been influenced by its concern over the effect on oil markets of any IAEA decisions that led toward the imposition of sanctions on Iran. Its abstention appears to indicate a hesitation to support any action which might adversely affect global oil prices and market stability. [21]

The Opposition
As expected, Cuba, Syria, and Venezuela were the three states voting against the resolution. These countries have not only taken political positions in opposition to the United States and its allies on other issues, but have also been strengthening their own ties with Iran in recent months. Venezuela was the sole Board member to vote against the September 24 resolution, and recently suggested it might seek Iranian assistance for a Venezuelan nuclear energy program. It also signed a joint declaration with Iran condemning the possession of nuclear arms by all states and declaring the right to peaceful nuclear energy. [22] The Syrian and Iranian leaders also met recently to strengthen the alliance between their countries, and economic ties between Cuba and Iran are also being bolstered. [23] [24]

A Cautious Increase in Support
The latest IAEA vote indicates increasing support for greater efforts to pressure Iran to come into compliance with its NPT commitments. Some of this additional support comes from a bloc that has traditionally defended Iran on the basis of the principle of the “inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” The fact that most NAM members of the IAEA Board have supported (or not opposed) calls for Iran to take measures to suspend a number of sensitive nuclear activities suggests there are growing doubts in this quarter that Iran’s intentions are entirely peaceful. At the same time, this additional support is hesitant, and a number of prominent NAM members remain wary of any escalation of pressure on Tehran, including the referral of the matter to the Security Council, even as they observe growing support for such measures.

Peter Crail – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies