On July 5, 2006, local time, North Korea flight tested seven ballistic missiles, including the long-range Taepodong-II (also known as the Paektusan-II). [1] South Korea’s cautious response to the tests caused an intense political reaction at home and exacerbated tensions in Seoul’s relations with the United States.

Missile Firings, Basing Data
The North Korean Foreign Ministry called the July 5 launches part of the “Korean People’s Army’s routine military exercises to increase the nation’s capacity for self-defense.” The Ministry emphasized that North Korea is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime and is not bound by any international laws or agreements restricting its missile tests. The Ministry also declared that Pyongyang’s missile development and deployment maintain a balance of forces and preserve peace and stability in the region. [2]

The Taepodong-II, thought to have a range of 5,000 to 6,000 kilometers, failed shortly after liftoff, but there were conflicting reports about the missile’s performance during the flight test. On July 6, Yi Sŏng-gyu, Director of Intelligence for South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the National Assembly that the missile developed problems about 42 seconds into flight but continued to fly for about seven minutes to a range of about 499 km. [3] However, the South Korean press reported in closed testimony before the National Assembly that officials of the South Korean National Intelligence Service estimated the missile developed engine problems and crashed into the sea off the coast of Musudan-ri about 40 seconds after liftoff. [4] The Japanese government initially believed the missile traveled somewhere between 400 and 640 kilometers from the launch site, but the Japanese media subsequently reported that according to U.S. intelligence, the missile apparently exploded about 1.5 km from the launch pad and fell into the sea about 40 seconds after liftoff. [5]

The North Korean exercise included the launch of four short-range (300-600 kilometer range) Scud variants and two medium-range (approximately 1,300 kilometer-range) Nodong missiles, launched from Kitaeryŏng, Anbyŏn-kun, Kangwŏn Province, about 40 kilometers south of Wŏnsan, a port city on North Korea’s east coast. The last missile tested appears to have been a Scud-ER (“extended range”) with a range of about 850 kilometers, which could potentially reach southern Japan, including Osaka. [6] (Most of Japan is also in range of the Nodong system.) Reports indicate that North Korea did not test a new intermediate-range (2,500 to 3,000 kilometers) ballistic missile (IRBM) that is under development, which is based upon
the Soviet-designed SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). [7]

According to a July 2006 report published by South Korea’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), a research institute under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, North Korea has deployed about 200 Nodong missiles and about 50 of the new IRBMs (SS-N-6 variant), which have yet to be flight tested. The report claims that North Korea has constructed a number of underground bases with ballistic missiles capable of striking Japan and U.S. military forces in East Asia. [8] The following table consolidates published information on North Korean missile bases, relying on information from this and the other sources listed.

North Korean Underground Missile Bases
Note: This list of underground missile bases is not exhaustive; additional bases could exist. The reliability of some of the information in this table is uncertain. Sources: Yun Tŏk-min, “Pukhan’ŭi t’andomisail p’ŭrogŭraem p’yŏngga [Assessment of the North Korean Missile Program],” IFANS, July 26, 2006; Yang Sŏng-uk, “Puk, chiha misailgiji kŏnsŏljung [North Constructing Underground Missile Bases],” Munhwa Ilbo, August 3, 2006, [http://www.munhwa.com]; Yi Myŏng-gŏn, “Puk, hanil chudun migun kyŏnyang misailgiji kŏnsŏl [North Builds Missile Bases Aimed at U.S. Military Forces in Korea, Japan],” Tong’a Ilbo, August 3, 2006, p. 2, in KINDS, [http://www.kinds.or.kr]; Nuclear Threat Initiative “North Korea Missile Profile: Missile Facilities-Missile Bases,” [http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/Missile/64_699.html].

Domestic Political Fallout in South Korea
The missile exercise has exposed political rifts in South Korea. After the North Korean launches, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun became the target of severe criticism from his opponents because he remained silent about North Korea’s tests until July 11. [9] In this vacuum, three National Assembly committees held hearings the day after the missile tests, giving the opposition Grand National Party (GNP or Hannaradang) an opportunity to condemn the Roh government. Pak Chin (Park Jin), GNP member of the Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee, called Roh’s national security policy and his North Korea policy total failures that have created a national crisis in foreign affairs and national security. Pak said Roh’s North Korea policy could not provide peace and security for South Korean citizens. Yi Hae-bong, GNP member of the same committee, said that the inter-Korean Kaesŏng Industrial Complex and Mt. Kŭmgang tourism project in North Korea, which South Korea has subsidized, should be closed down and that fertilizer and food aid should be suspended unless Pyongyang promised it would not launch missiles again and returned to the Six-Party talks on ending its nuclear weapons program. (In addition to North Korea, China, Japan, Russia, South Korea and the United States are participants in these talks.)

Hwang Chin-ha and Yi Sŏng-gu, GNP members of the National Assembly’s National Defense Committee, said that at 4:00 a.m., on July 5, a mere 20 minutes after the first launch, the Japanese Prime Minister began to chair a meeting on North Korea’s action, but that the ROK defense minister did not get his first report until 4:10 a.m. and President Roh did not receive a report on the launch until about 5:00 a.m. Even Kim Myŏng-ja and Yi Kŭn-sik, ruling Uri Party members of the National Defense Committee, called the Roh government’s response “too passive.” [10]

The GNP conducted briefings and issued several statements that were sharply critical of the Roh government. On July 10, the GNP spokesperson accused Roh of “sleeping peacefully while North Korea fired missiles,” and demanded that Roh “wake up.” The spokesperson said it was a “comedy” when the Blue House (the South Korean presidential residence and office) explained that Roh had remained silent because he did not want to surprise the South Korean people. [11] The GNP welcomed UN Security Council Resolution 1695 condemning the North Korean tests and imposing sanctions against the North Korean missile program and said the party was opposed to the North Korean missile tests because other countries in the region, including South Korea,“would have no choice but to increase their armaments” in response. [12] The GNP called Roh’s North Korea policy a “complete failure” and accused the Roh government of having no “will or desire to protect the lives and assets of the South Korean people.” [13]

It appears that Roh and his advisors were concerned about overreacting and raising tensions with North Korea, fearing this could enflame the regional security environment and destabilize South Korean markets and investor confidence. On July 9, the Office of the President of South Korea issued a blistering rebuttal, which accused the opposition party and some of the media of exaggerating the threat and playing on citizens’ fear for political purposes—just as South Korea’s authoritarian rulers had exploited such anxieties prior to democratization. The statement also said there was no reason “to make a fuss like Japan.” [14] The GNP seized on Roh’s statement that there is no need to overreact, claiming that it amounted to a declaration that South Korea was opposed to international cooperation in dealing with the North Korean missile issue. [15]

Growing Tensions in U.S.-ROK Alliance
In the weeks after the July 5 North Korean missile exercise, a growing rift between Washington and Seoul has become evident.

On July 13, 2006, General Burwell B. Bell, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, criticized Seoul for its tranquil reaction to the missile exercise, and he counseled South Korean lawmakers to consider the deployment of missile defenses. [16] Bell’s advice drew a swift rebuke from the Uri Party’s Kim Wŏn-ung, chairman of the National Assembly’s Unification, Foreign Affairs, and Trade Committee. In response to Bell’s remarks that North Korea has approximately 800 Scud and Nodong missiles targeting South Korea, Kim said that the missiles are not really aimed at South Korea per se, but at U.S. military bases in South Korea in order to retaliate against any U.S. preemptive strike. [17]

The Chosŏn Ilbo, a major South Korean conservative daily, published an editorial that in turn challenged Kim, stating, “Kim’s remarks make it difficult to tell whether Kim is the chairman of North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly or the chairman of the National Assembly’s Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee.” [18]

Bell’s remarks were made against a background of wider U.S.-South Korea disharmony over how best to manage North Korea’s unconventional weapons and advanced delivery systems, with Seoul committed to a strategy of engagement, and Washington, while prepared to pursue negotiations, favoring a strategy of isolating and penalizing Pyongyang. The difference in viewpoints was seen in the two states’ differing perspectives on the content of a UN Security Council resolution responding to the July 5 missile firings, as the United States sought to impose powerful sanctions on North Korea, while South Korea preferred a more moderate result.

As these events were unfolding, U.S. - South Korean relations were also perturbed by
uncertainties over the future of the Combined Forces Command (CFC). At a security forum hosted by the South Korean National Assembly on July 13, Bell also told lawmakers that the United States was considering disbanding the CFC, which combines U.S. and ROK military forces under a single command in wartime, and establishing separate command structures for U.S. Forces Korea and ROK military forces. Bell said the United States has been studying this option since October 2005, but that a final decision had not been made. [19]

In early August, seventeen former ROK defense ministers expressed their opposition to disbanding the CFC, which many South Koreans believe is critical in deterring North Korea and symbolic of Washington’s alliance commitment. [20] The Bush Administration has proposed dismantling the CFC in 2009, and Seoul has countered with the suggestion that the change be postponed until 2011 or 2012. [21] While the debate continued over the status of the bilateral alliance, President Roh said on August 9 that the ROK could exercise operational control of its forces during a conflict as required, if the CFC were suddenly to be disbanded. [22] At a press conference the next day in Seoul, Representative Henry Hyde, chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, said he “would support a transfer of operational control at the earliest possible moment.” [23]

There are other signs of a deepening split between Washington and Seoul. During a television interview on July 23, ROK Unification Minister Yi Chong-sŏk (Lee Jong-seok) said that the United States failed more than anyone else in preventing North Korea from conducting the July 5 missile exercise. [24] Minister Yi’s remarks drew criticism from both ruling and opposition party lawmakers, but President Roh defended Yi’s comments before reporters two days later. [25] Both Roh and Yi have expressed opposition to any economic sanctions against North Korea in retaliation for the missile tests, but Tokyo and Washington have pursued more punitive measures against Pyongyang. [26]

September U.S.-South Korea Summit
As ties between Seoul and Washington continued to deteriorate, the Blue House announced on August 16 that Roh would meet President George W. Bush in Washington, on September 14. North Korea’s nuclear program and missile tests will be high on the agenda, and the two leaders will also discuss the U.S.-ROK alliance and negotiations over a proposed bilateral free trade agreement, among other issues. [27]

However, the day after the summit arrangements were announced, the South Korean press reported that during an “off-the-record conversation with a few reporters” on August 13, President Roh stated he had low expectations for his meeting with President Bush. According to the Korea Times and the Hankook Ilbo, Roh said, “I don’t think I can persuade the United States anymore. I think it would also be tough for me to persuade Bush to normalize relations with Pyongyang at next month’s summit.” [28] Roh’s comments indicate his belief that Washington needs to ease its hard line against Pyongyang in order to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, but the Bush Administration may be highly unlikely to reverse its policy towards North Korea in the wake of the July missile exercise.

Daniel A. Pinkston – Monterey Institute of International Studies