An on-going debate over the implementation of Brazil’s nuclear energy program, which has pitted pro-nuclear energy advocates in Brazil’s Minister of Science and Technology against Brazil’s President Luis Ignacio Lula da Silva and other members of his cabinet, has focused attention on similarities between the Brazilian nuclear program and that of Iran – and underscored important differences between them.

Background
The debate came into the open in January 2006, when Brazilian Science and Technology Minister Sergio Rezende was preparing to announce the start up of the initial module of the country’s first commercial uranium enrichment plant. [1] The facility, located at Resende, in the state of Rio de Janeiro, uses gas centrifuge technology. At the time, the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was considering whether Iran’s secret, two-decade development of similar enrichment technology, in violation of Iran’s obligation to report such activity to the agency, warranted sending the issue to the UN Security Council for further action. [2] In September 2005, the IAEA had declared Iran to be in non-compliance with its inspection agreement and had called upon it to suspend all further uranium enrichment activities.

The controversy over Iran that formed the backdrop for the Brazilian delay centered on whether Iran might be secretly intending to employ its nascent uranium enrichment program not solely for the production of low-enriched uranium nuclear power plant fuel, as it claimed, but also to produce highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons.

Concerned that formally commissioning a new enrichment plant in early January might draw unfavorable international attention to Brazil’s nuclear activities because of similarities between the two countries’ enrichment programs, President Lula da Silva intervened and ordered the postponement of the official start up of the Resende facility. [3] Brazilian press accounts in mid-January stated that the delay allowed Brazil to avoid acting “at an inopportune time” that could have resulted in “hasty comparisons of its program with that of Iran.” On February 4, the IAEA voted to send the Iran file to the Security Council, with Brazil voting in favor of this action. [4]

Seeking to regain momentum for Brazil’s nuclear program, on March 7, 2006, Science and Technology Minister Rezende announced that Brazil would resume construction of its third nuclear power plant, Angra 3, in the state of Rio de Janeiro, build seven more such plants over 15 years, and expand the Resende enrichment plant so as “to supply 60 percent of the needs at the [currently operating] Angra 1 and 2 plants by 2010….” [5] Rezende’s expansive plan for Brazil’s nuclear future was almost immediately overruled, however, when President Lula da Silva, at a March 9 news conference with UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, declared that the government had “not yet made any decision” about building more nuclear power plants. The next day, Lula stated that the construction of other nuclear reactors “is not a priority for his government, at this moment,” and that the government instead would build the Belo Monte hydroelectric plant in the Vitoria do Xingu region of the state of Para and consider two more on the Madeira River in the state of Rondonia. [6]

Although the decision not to pursue the plans announced by Minister Rezende raised questions as to whether future domestic demand would be sufficient to justify a significant expansion of the Brazilian uranium enrichment program, the first module of the Resende enrichment plant reportedly began operating in April 2006 and was formally dedicated on May 5, 2006. [7]

Parallels with Iran
Brazil’s commitment to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes is widely accepted today. It is a party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) (1994) and the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1994), both of which prohibit it from developing nuclear arms and require all nuclear activities in Brazil to be monitored by the IAEA. The country’s 1988 constitution also mandates that all nuclear activities in the country be devoted exclusively for peaceful purposes. In addition, in 1991 Brazil joined with Argentina in launching a bilateral nuclear inspection organization, the Argentina-Brazil Accounting and Control Commission (ABACC). Brazil has also been welcomed as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), aimed at limiting the transfer of sensitive technology to states of proliferation concern. In addition, Brazil has declared that it will use the Resende plant to produce only low-enriched uranium. Nonetheless, there are notable parallels between the Brazilian enrichment program and that of Iran, which formed the background for the concerns of the Brazilian government in January 2006.

Similar Technology
Both programs rely on the same basic technology, the gas centrifuge. These highly complex machines are vertical cylinders that spin at high speeds and swirl uranium in gaseous form to separate and concentrate the most easily split type of uranium atom, uranium-235, which is found at a concentration of only 0.7 percent in natural uranium. The centrifuges are arranged in series, known as cascades, which can be made up of thousands of individual machines. Uranium enriched to between three and five percent is used as fuel in modern nuclear power plants (such as Brazil’s Angra 2 and 3), but the enrichment process can also be used to upgrade uranium to the levels used in nuclear weapons, usually 90 percent or more uranium-235. By modifying the operation of a centrifuge enrichment plant that is structured to produce low-enriched uranium, this material can be re-enriched rapidly to make weapons-grade uranium. Thus, once a state is operating a facility to produce low-enriched uranium, it has the latent capability to produce material for nuclear weapons.

As parties to the NPT, both Brazil and Iran are obligated to place all of their nuclear activities under IAEA inspection. Like Brazil, Iran asserts that it plans to produce only low-enriched uranium for nuclear power plant fuel. However, the circumstances surrounding the Iranian enrichment program, in particular Iran’s failure to disclose the program for nearly two decades, have created concerns that once it completes a uranium enrichment facility, Iran might withdraw from the NPT and rapidly manufacture nuclear weapons.

Ambiguous Origins of Centrifuge Enrichment Program
According to IAEA reports, the Iranian enrichment program relies on designs supplied by Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan and recent evidence suggests that it is supported by on-going illicit procurement efforts. [8] [See “Iran Exploited Turkish Trading Firm to Procure Dual-Use Goods from Western European, U.S. Firms” in this issue of WMD Insights.] Khan illegally obtained the designs in the mid-1970s while working at a Dutch subsidiary of URENCO, the British-Dutch-German commercial uranium enrichment consortium. The designs also became the basis for the Pakistani uranium enrichment program, which produces highly enriched uranium for the country’s nuclear weapons program.

The Resende gas centrifuges also have a doubtful pedigree. In the late 1970s, when the country was under military rule, Brazil established a secret project called “The Parallel Program,” involving all branches of the military, which was apparently aimed at developing a nuclear weapons capability. [9] At the time, Brazil was not a party to the NPT or any other treaty prohibiting the development of nuclear arms, and it did not place facilities involved in the program under IAEA monitoring.

The most successful project in the “Parallel Program” was a Brazilian Navy project to use gas centrifuges to produce enriched uranium fuel for nuclear powered submarines – but which would also have provided the capability for producing material for nuclear weapons. The program first successfully enriched uranium in late 1986. This led to the construction of a pilot-scale gas centrifuge facility at the Aramar Research Center, in Ipero, near Sao Paulo. In 1989, Brazilian officials announced that the first module of this facility had produced 20 percent enriched uranium. [10] Many observers believe that the Aramar centrifuges were initially based on a URENCO design, which Brazil is alleged to have obtained clandestinely with the help of several German scientists. [11] (It is now known that, at the time, these individuals were assisting Iraq with its uranium enrichment centrifuge program. One of the scientists was later arrested in Brazil and extradited to Germany, where he was found guilty of illegally exporting centrifuge components to Iraq. [12]) Brazil is believed to have improved the centrifuges, however, substituting stronger carbon fiber for special “maraging” steel to manufacture the units’ high-speed rotors and developing a unique, electromagnetic bottom bearing. [13]

The gas centrifuges operating at Resende are believed to be based upon the improved Aramar designs. [14] Brazil, however, has refused to permit outsiders to see the units, claiming that they are based on proprietary technology, including the new electromagnetic bearing. [15] In particular, Brazil has insisted that the centrifuges be shrouded when the IAEA inspects the Resende facility; the agency has acquiesced in this restriction, after determining that it can adequately monitor the installation by tracking flows in and out of the centrifuges, without observing the units directly. [16] Some analysts believe that the true reason behind Brazil’s refusal to show the centrifuges is that this would reveal them to be based on the improperly obtained German design. [17]

Opposition to the IAEA “Additional Protocol”
A third similarity between the Brazilian and Iranian nuclear programs has been that both countries have refused to ratify an amendment to their respective inspection agreements with the agency, known as the “Additional Protocol,” which would grant the IAEA expanded inspection rights.

Until late 2005, Iran had for several years voluntarily agreed to permit the IAEA to conduct expanded “Additional Protocol” inspections and had even permitted more extensive monitoring and investigations of its nuclear activities than required by that document. Iran’s new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, however, curtailed these expanded rights in late 2005, and currently the IAEA is limited to its classic inspection authority, which limits its ability to pursue leads concerning suspected nuclear sites that have not been declared by Iran. This contraction of IAEA authority has added to suspicions that Iran is attempting to conceal secret activities connected to the development of nuclear weapons.

Although Brazil is not suspected of harboring nuclear weapon ambitions, it, too, has refused to accept an Additional Protocol amendment to its inspection agreement with the IAEA. [18] The reasons for Brazil’s reluctance are not clear. In 2004, Brazilian officials were reported to have complained that the inspection arrangements under the Additional Protocol were “too rigid,” that they unnecessarily applied to research institutes and universities, and that they might facilitate “technological piracy.” [19] In September 2005, the head of the Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commission, Odair Gonçalves, stated without further explanation that Brazil had delayed its decision on the matter until after the April 2005 NPT Review Conference and was now studying the matter. He rejected the suggestion that Brazil feared having to disclose details about its nuclear history prior to joining the NPT in 1994. [20]

Uncertain Commercial Justification
Civilian uranium enrichment programs are extremely costly and are generally recognized to be cost-effective only in cases where economies of scale can be exploited, such as cases in which the state building an enrichment facility possesses a large nuclear power program to provide a domestic market for the facility’s output or in which the state has prospects for a substantial foreign market. For many years, however, international supply of enriched uranium has outstripped demand, driving prices of enriched uranium down. While an upsurge in nuclear power plant construction is widely anticipated, it is unquestionably more economical at this time to purchase enriched uranium on the international market, rather than to construct an indigenous enrichment capability, and this situation is likely to prevail for some time to come.

Thus when states with no apparent domestic or foreign market for enriched uranium build enrichment plants, the activity raises suspicions that the state has another goal in mind, namely the development of a nuclear weapon capability. The United States, among other nations, has emphasized that Iran, with only a single nuclear power plant under construction (whose fuel is to be supplied by Russia) and no additional nuclear power plants on order, has no apparent need for a costly domestic uranium enrichment capability, thus strongly suggesting that the capability was being acquired for military purposes. Indeed, given Iran’s vast supplies of oil and largely untapped natural gas reserves, Washington has argued that Iran’s entire civilian nuclear energy program cannot be justified economically and is a cover for a clandestine nuclear weapons effort.

Brazil’s nuclear power program similarly provides little commercial justification for its enrichment program: it possesses only two operating power reactors, which are both covered by existing long-term fuel arrangements with external suppliers. President Lula da Silva’s recent decision to defer construction of the Angra 3 reactor and to concentrate on non-nuclear sources for electricity production, moreover, indicates that a substantial domestic market for indigenously produced enriched uranium is unlikely to emerge for many years. Indeed, given the leanings of the Lula da Silva government, it may be difficult for Resende’s champions to obtain governmental funds to complete the facility.

Should the worldwide use of nuclear energy grow substantially, however, the economics of enrichment in Brazil could change. Brazil’s nuclear champions hope that, with the world’s sixth largest reserves of uranium ore, Brazil may one day emerge as one of a relatively small number of suppliers of enriched uranium. [21] Brazil has already entered the enriched uranium export market on a small scale, providing 800 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to Argentina for use in a research reactor. [22]

Significance for the United States
In a major address at the U.S. National Defense University on February 11, 2004, President Bush called on the nations of the world to limit the spread of plutonium separation and enrichment technologies. In particular, he urged that:

The 40 nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing [plutonium separation] equipment and technologies to any state that does not already possess full-scale, functioning enrichment and reprocessing plants. This step will prevent new states from developing the means to produce fissile material for nuclear bombs. Proliferators must not be allowed to cynically manipulate the NPT to acquire the material and infrastructure necessary for manufacturing illegal weapons. [23]