On December 4, during his first state visit to India, Russia’s president Dmitry Medvedev confirmed that Moscow was considering leasing a nuclear submarine to New Delhi. [1] The prime candidate for this decade-long lease, a Russian Akula-II (Project 971) class nuclear-powered attack submarine, is apparently the K-152 Nerpa, which made headlines in early November because of a fatal accident that occurred during Russian sea trials. [2] A year ago, WMD Insights reported on the possible Indian Navy lease of this Akula-II class submarine, allegedly constructed with New Delhi’s financial assistance. For almost a decade, as press reports speculated about the training of Indian nuclear submariners at Russian facilities and detailed breakdowns of secret bilateral talks due to price hikes and delays on Moscow’s part, Russian defense officials denied that the boat would be leased to India. [3] (See “Questions Persist on Reported Russian Lease of Nuclear Sub to India,” WMD Insights, December 2007-January 2008.)

The change in Moscow’s public stance on the lease appears to have been triggered by the Nerpa’s November 8 accident in the Sea of Japan off the coast of Vladivostok. Twenty individuals died from suffocation and twenty-one more were injured when the submarine’s chemical fire suppression system unexpectedly activated, releasing a gas that displaced oxygen in the submarine’s first and second compartments. [4] While investigators have yet to conclude officially whether a technical malfunction or human error was at fault, on November 24, officials arrested a contract sailor suspected of tinkering with the fire suppression system. [5] Russian authorities have maintained that no fire broke out on the boat, and the accident did not result in a release of radiation or damage to the submarine’s reactor. [6] In the wake of the tragedy, Russian defense officials maintained that the Nerpa would not be leased, but Medvedev’s confirmation of ongoing negotiations reassured New Delhi that Moscow is committed to hammering out an agreement. [7]

Though international law does not prohibit the lease of nuclear-powered submarines, by leasing the Nerpa Russia would exploit a loophole in the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) that exempts naval nuclear reactors from International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Yet, Moscow’s plans to lease the nuclear boat to New Delhi have not made waves in Washington, which until recently was a fervent critic of all aspects of Russo-Indian nuclear cooperation. Additionally, the lease would take place at a time when some experts have raised concerns regarding Brazil’s quest to operate a nuclear-powered submarine – at present only a privilege of the five nuclear weapons states. [8]

A Nuclear Boat Crowns the Russo-Indian Partnership
Medvedev’s first state visit to India on December 4-5, 2008 came at an interesting time for Russo-Indian relations. A long-planned conclusion to the Year of Russia in India, the trip was not derailed by the dramatic terrorist standoff in the Indian city of Mumbai on November 26-29, yet it had to be cut by a day due to the December 5 death of the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Alexy II. Though short, the visit marked several important bilateral cooperation milestones, including in the nuclear and defense spheres. [9]

A September 2008 decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to exempt India from its guidelines – a move long sought by Moscow – allowed Russia and India to finalize a much-anticipated nuclear cooperation agreement. [10] This agreement, apparently based on the January 2007 memorandum of understanding between Moscow and New Delhi, will result in Russia constructing additional nuclear reactor units at the Kudankulam site in India and at other sites in the country. (For more information on Russo-Indian nuclear cooperation, see “Eager to Increase Nuclear Exports, Russia Awaits Nuclear Suppliers Group Exemption for India,” WMD Insights, February 2008.)

Bilateral discussions in the military-technical cooperation sphere appear to have been similarly productive. India, historically reliant on Russia for advanced conventional weapons, had expressed increased frustration over the Russian enterprises’ delays, rising costs, and poor equipment quality. [11] Faced with growing competition in the Indian defense market, Moscow has recently shown its willingness to “go beyond the buyer-seller relationship” with New Delhi, which has longed for joint development projects similar to the Russo-Indian collaboration on the BrahMos cruise missile program. (For background information, see “India Expands Foreign Collaboration in Missile and Space Program, Tests Missile Defense System,” WMD Insights, March 2008.)

In a December 4 interview with an Indian broadcasting company on the eve of the bilateral summit, the Russian president was unexpectedly asked whether “in the next few months” Russia and India would agree on “leasing out to India of a nuclear submarine.” Medvedev was circumspect in his response and stated, “leasing of nuclear submarines [is] indeed an important area of cooperation.” Yet, the reporter followed-up with these questions: “Was there a tragic accident on one of your submarines? Did it affect the negotiations on the sale or lease?” Again, Medvedev carefully avoided answering by saying that there was “no negative influence on our relations because … this sad accident, which is now under investigation … does not characterize the state of … this nuclear submarine.” [12]

The Nerpa Sea-Trials
The thirteen-year construction of the Nerpa was completed at the Amurskiy shipyard (in Komsomolsk-on-Amur, Khabarovsk territory) during the summer of 2006. Induction of the boat into service with Russia’s Pacific Fleet was planned for February 2007 upon completion of tests and sea trials. A July 2006 article in Kommersant noted that a subsequent lease to the Indian Navy – reportedly a major source of funding for the submarine – was also possible. [13] Yet, dry testing of the Nerpa carried out by workers from both the Amurskiy and Sevmash shipyards only finished in June 2008. [14] The boat arrived in the closed city of Bolshoy Kamen on Russia’s Pacific coast for sea trials in the Sea of Japan on October 27, and made its first dive on October 31. [15]

The Nerpa was completing its third dive on the evening of November 8 with 208 individuals on board, including a civilian delivery crew and 81 Russian Navy contract sailors. [16] At approximately 3:30 a.m. local time (8:30 p.m. Moscow time), the boat’s chemical fire extinguishing system suddenly activated in the forward torpedo compartment and the battery compartment. [17] These two compartments quickly filled with a Freon-like gas, which displaced oxygen, and were immediately sealed off. [18] The crews on the submarine worked in shifts during sea trials and many individuals were sleeping in the battery compartment when the gas release occurred. A representative of the Prosecutor General’s Office would later confirm that deaths and injuries resulted from inhalation of this gas, though it remains unclear why the victims failed to utilize portable breathing devices, which everyone on board was required to carry. [19]

The accident resulted in the deaths of 20 men, including three contract sailors. The Udaloy-class destroyer Admiral Tributs took an additional 21 injured individuals, two of them contract sailors, to a Pacific Fleet hospital for treatment. [20] Escorted by the rescue vessel Sayany, the Nerpa made its way back to Bolshoy Kamen. Upon its arrival, no damage was found to the thoroughly ventilated boat. [21] Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Nikolay Makarov stated that Nerpa was “on-stream and in good technical condition,” and noted that “despite the sad fatal accident, [the boat had] demonstrated reliable operation … of units and control systems.” [22]

President Medvedev was immediately informed about the tragedy by Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov and ordered an investigation. [23] Russian press accounts have so far diverged on whether the “human factor” or a technical failure should be faulted for the deaths. [24] A recording device on the submarine allegedly indicated an adjustment to a temperature sensor in the battery compartment just before the fire suppression system automatically activated. Subsequently, investigators announced on November 13 that they were questioning a watchman on guard during that evening – contract sailor Dmitriy Grobov. [25] The investigators have stated that the sailor, who has since confessed, likely acted unintentionally. [26] On November 24, Grobov was charged with “inflicting death by negligence,” in accordance with article 109 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. If found guilty, he faces up to five years in prison. [27] Responding to public concerns, representatives of the Prosecutor General’s Office have stressed that the “degree of culpability of officials, both civil and military ones, in the tragedy” was also being ascertained. [28]

Several of Grobov’s fellow servicemen, however, have contended that the Nerpa’s fire suppression system went off because of a technical failure. [29] Head of Amurskiy Shipyard Gennadiy Vasilyev similarly suggested that a design flaw could have triggered an inadvertent activation of the system. [30] Press reports have also argued that engineers from the delivery commission corrected certain flaws in the system shortly before sea trials. [31] These claims notwithstanding, Russian defense officials state that the Navy will continue to utilize this fire suppression system model although all boats would have to undergo additional checks. [32] In any event, Nerpa’s tragic sea trials raise additional questions regarding the safety and reliability of Russian defense equipment. As it stands, Russia reportedly leads the world in nuclear submarine accidents—a total of 10 since 1992, including the disastrous sinking of the Kursk in 2000. [33]

As Lease Negotiations Move Forward, What Use for the Boat?
Despite the accident, New Delhi retains its interest in leasing the Nerpa, christened the INS Chakra by the Indian Navy. [34] Indian Navy Chief, Admiral Sureesh Mehta, however, has confirmed that the tragedy briefly threatened to scuttle the lease negotiations. [35] Some reports in the Russian press questioned whether the Indians would want to receive the ill-fated submarine. [36] Others speculated about a high-level Russian decision to allocate funding for domestic procurement of the Nerpa. [37] Still others suggested that this incident might add to the growing list of critics of the deal in New Delhi and put a further damper on Russo-Indian military-technical cooperation. [38] Yet, Medvedev’s December 4 comment marked a turning point. A few days later, a spokesperson for Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation confirmed that “there [was] a real possibility that several submarines … of the same class as the Nerpa … may be leased to India for ten years.” [39]

According to Admiral Mehta, the Indian Navy sees the Nerpa as a training vessel for its naval operators before the launch of India’s own indigenous nuclear-powered submarine, the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV). [40] From 1988-1991, the Soviet Union leased a Charlie-II class (Project 670M) nuclear-powered boat, also christened the INS Chakra, to India for that purpose. (The ATV project has been plagued by delays but is reportedly set to finally start sea trials sometime in 2009. [41] Some observers say that India plans indigenous production of “at least three to five more” nuclear-powered boats. [42]) New Delhi sources say that teams of Indian submariners continue to train on a simulator at a training facility in Sosnovyy Bor, close to St. Petersburg, Russia. [43] Reports in November 2008 suggest that after the accident, New Delhi still planned to send 40 Indian Navy personnel for “hands-on” training on the Nerpa in early 2009. [44]

The prospective lease, however, has at times has been used by the Indians to pack a rhetorical punch – particularly where China is concerned. [45] In May 2008, when a U.S. analyst revealed that China was constructing a base at Hainan island, Admiral Mehta was quoted as saying that India’s two nuclear-powered boats, the INS Chakra and the ATV, would eventually constitute the third leg of India’s nuclear triad. [46] Although Indian press reports have continuously speculated that New Delhi was seeking to arm the ATV and the INS Chakra with “indigenously designed cruise missiles with a range of around 1,000 km,” India does not possess long-range submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), conventional or nuclear. [47] In addition, while some analysts have argued that the Russian boat could be used as a “primary test platform for nuclear-armed naval missiles,” the accuracy of these statements remains unclear. [48] Finally, although India’s submarine-launched missile development program includes both cruise and ballistic missiles, and scarcity of information has often led to contradictory press reports, it is unknown whether India has a small enough warhead to fit on these missiles. [49] (For discussion of the type of missile that could be fitted on the Nerpa, see “Questions Persist on Reported Russian Lease of Nuclear Sub to India”; for more on India’s cruise missile program, see “India and Pakistan Missile Race Surges On,” WMD Insights, October 2007.)

Deal Sets Dangerous Precedent for Nuclear Propulsion Proliferation, Yet Few Take Caution
International agreements do not prohibit this type of a transaction, but Russia’s lease of a nuclear-powered submarine to India, much like the Soviet Union’s lease of a nuclear boat to the country, sets a proliferation precedent that is potentially exploitable by other states. As U.S. nonproliferation expert Dr. James Clay Moltz has repeatedly warned, the NPT regime exempts transfers of technology and materials related to nuclear propulsion from International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring. [50] This exemption from safeguards creates a loophole under which recipients could, in theory, use transferred nuclear materials – for example, supplies of fresh submarine reactor fuel – for nuclear weapons without detection by international inspectors. [51]

Surprisingly, however, the Russo-Indian deal appears to have gone unnoticed in Washington, D.C. In a December 17, 2008 statement to the press, the former Acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Rood was prompted to comment on Moscow’s pending submarine lease. Rood stated that he was unfamiliar with “this report,” but noted that if “the Russian Government chose to proceed with those kinds of sales, we’d certainly take a look at it.” That said, Rood maintained that proliferation of nuclear submarines was not a “central issue in the nonproliferation regime right now.” [52]

Yet, Russia’s high-level confirmation of the ten year lease negotiations comes as Brazil, a non-nuclear state that until 1985 had kept open its nuclear option, continues on its quest to possess a nuclear-powered submarine. [53] As was previously reported in WMD Insights, Brazil has been seeking technology transfers from France in order to complete its nuclear submarine project indigenously. Analysts have also raised concerns about the evolution of public discourse on the nuclear issue in the country and the Brazilian Navy’s “dogged pursuit” of naval nuclear propulsion, especially in light of growing regional tensions with Venezuela. (See “Brazil’s Pursuit of a Nuclear Submarine Raises Proliferation Concerns,” WMD Insights, March 2008.) “ [I]n a few years Brazil will be part of the select group of countries that possess this crucial element in building an effective deterrent ability,” the country’s president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva proclaimed in December 2008. [54]

Thus, Nerpa’s coming up for air in the Indian Ocean is bound to send visible proliferation ripples all across the water.

Anya Loukianova – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies