On September 6, 2007, Israeli planes entered Syrian airspace and attacked a ground target near the town of Al Kibar in northeast Syria. Information related to the attack had been cloaked in an unusual veil of secrecy; American, Israeli, Arab, and other governments were not been eager to discuss the matter. Last month, however, the U.S. intelligence community made public additional details about the incident. According to U.S. assessments, the target of the Israeli strike was a Syrian nuclear reactor under construction with North Korean assistance. Even if the U.S. intelligence community has accurately characterized the target, the recent revelations leave unresolved some of the larger issues related to the actors’ motives and the implications and consequences of the incident.

Background
During the early morning of September 6, 2007, several Israeli warplanes entered Syria and destroyed a large building in the area of Deir az-Zor. The Syrian government initially confirmed only that Israeli planes entered Syrian airspace before coming under anti-aircraft fire from Syrian air defenses, after which they departed. [1] Syrian officials repeatedly changed their story about the aircrafts’ ground target. They initially claimed that the planes had been forced to drop their munitions in the desert, hitting nothing. They subsequently asserted that an agricultural facility had been targeted, a claim that was promptly denied by the named agricultural facility. [2] Later, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad alleged that the Israeli planes hit a military building under construction, but he denied the structure was engaged in WMD-related activities. [3]

In any case, satellite imagery from before and after the strike showed that Syrian personnel had razed the site, making it difficult for international inspectors to detect suspicious activity that might have occurred. [4] According to a U.S. intelligence briefing, “Syria destroyed the remainder of the reactor building with a massive controlled demolition on October 10, 2007, as part of an ongoing effort to remove all evidence of the reactor’s existence.” [5] Syrian engineers subsequently constructed a new building on the same site.

The Israeli government adamantly refused to comment on the incident. When opposition leader Benjamin Netanyahu indirectly confirmed the attack, his comments were harshly criticized by the nation’s political and defense establishments. [6] Israeli military censors permitted Israeli journalists only to reference information and arguments that had previously been published in the Western media. [7]

The Israeli government’s silence and the military’s strict censorship may have been an attempt to lessen pressure on the Syrians to retaliate. [8] In addition, Israeli officials could have sought to avert a public debate about the justifications for the attack because some U.S. analysts and policy makers reportedly considered the available intelligence of a possible Syrian threat—nuclear or otherwise—insufficient to warrant a preemptive air strike. [9] Finally, the incident occurred at an awkward time. The Bush administration was then trying to organize a regional peace conference that would include both Israel and Syria. [10]

The U.S. government also declined to comment formally on the September 6 events. Although 22 senior lawmakers received classified briefings on the incident in September and October 2007, they were not permitted to discuss the information, although some did call for more extensive briefings or some kind of public statement by the administration. [11] President George Bush subsequently said that his administration had initially declined to comment on the Israeli attack to reduce the risks of Syrian retaliation. [12]

Recent Intelligence Revelations
In late April 2008, CIA Director Michael Hayden and other senior U.S. intelligence officials briefed a wider range of congressional members and their staffs about the September 6 incident. They also offered formal, if anonymous, briefings to the media, outlining their assessments of the Israeli attack. The briefings included a video, entitled “Syria’s Covert Nuclear Reactor at Al Kibar,” that featured satellite images, three-dimensional computer models, and still photographs of the facility. Additional photographs of encounters between North Korean and Syrian nuclear personnel were also presented. [13]

According to the briefings, U.S. intelligence agencies first began receiving evidence about Syrian-North Korean nuclear cooperation, as well as possible nuclear activity at the Al Kibar site, in the late 1990s. U.S. government analysts estimate that construction of the reactor likely began in 2001. Last spring, American intelligence obtained additional information about the Al Kibar facility, including interior as well as close-up exterior photographs. These additional data—combined with a reassessment of earlier information that had been ambiguous—led them to conclude that Syrians and North Koreans were constructing a nuclear reactor at the site. [14]

Director Hayden described the target of the Israeli attack as a gas-cooled, graphite-moderated nuclear reactor whose “size and technology” resembled that of the North Korean nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. He told reporters that the reactor was within months of completion when it was bombed. Hayden estimated that, “In the course of a year after they got full up, they would have produced enough plutonium for one or two weapons.” After that, “We would estimate that the production rate there would be about the same as Yongbyon, which is about enough plutonium for one or two weapons per year.” [15]

In terms of assessing Syrian intentions, U.S. analysts inferred from the available information that the nuclear reactor probably, in the words of White House spokesperson Dana Perino, “was not intended for peaceful purposes.” [16] The video narration claimed that the reactor, lacking the power lines and switching facilities normally associated with an energy-generating complex, “was not configured to produce electricity” and “was ill-suited for research,” at least compared with Syria’s existing legitimate nuclear research facilities. These considerations—as well as Syrian officials’ confused public comments on the issue, their refusal to invite international inspectors to the site, and their strenuous efforts to dismantle the damaged building following the attack—led the U.S. intelligence community to conclude that the reactor was intended eventually to contribute to a Syrian nuclear weapons program. [17]

Nevertheless, U.S. intelligence analysts acknowledged that the confidence level of this last supposition was “low” because of still unresolved questions surrounding the facility. They told reporters: “There’s no other reason for it. But our confidence level that it’s weapons is low at this point. We believe it, but it’s low based on the physical evidence.” [18] The experts, for example, remain uncertain how Syrians planned to fuel the reactor without manufacturing uranium fuel rods from natural uranium. The absence of a source of fuel also leaves unclear when the reactor might have entered into operation. The intelligence analysts also acknowledge the lack of any evidence suggesting that the Syrians were building a reprocessing facility, which would enable technicians to separate plutonium from the spent fuel rods removed from the reactor for possible use in an atomic bomb. (Sending the spent fuel to another country, such as North Korea, for reprocessing would have risked detection by the Proliferation Security Initiative and other international monitoring activities.) To overcome these uncertainties, Perino urged the Syrian government to “come clean” about its nuclear program. [19]

The U.S. analysts expressed more confidence in what the North Koreans hoped to gain through nuclear cooperation with Syria—“cash”—rather than a possible place to relocate sensitive North Korean nuclear technologies and materials, as suspected by many skeptics of Pyongyang’s newfound commitment to curbing nuclear nonproliferation. [20]

The recent revelations confirm what always had been the most popular interpretation of the September 6 events—that the Israelis had attacked a target linked to a joint Syrian-North Korean nuclear program. A September 18 article in the New York Times, for example, cited current and former Israeli and U.S. security experts, who had received Israeli briefings on the incident, as describing the target as a component of “a rudimentary Syrian nuclear program.” [21] An October 14 article in the same publication confirmed the story that Israeli aircraft destroyed an incipient nuclear reactor that the Syrians were building with North Korean technical assistance. The Israelis allegedly feared that the Syrians intended to employ the graphite-moderated reactor in the same manner as the North Koreans had used Yongbyon: to produce the plutonium required to create atomic bombs. [22]

Syrian Denials and Arab Silence
After the U.S. government briefing, Damascus issued a statement accusing Washington of
complicity in the Israeli attack: “The US administration was apparently party to the execution of the September raid by Israeli warplanes on eastern Syria.” [23] Although “a senior administration official” confirmed that the American and Israeli governments had exchanged intelligence and assessments about what was happening, the U.S. policy maker insisted that in the end the Israelis alone concluded that they had to destroy the reactor because it represented an “existential threat” to Israel’s survival, “without a green light from us….None was asked for, none was given.” [24]

Syrian officials have continued to reject accusations that the site was connected to a nuclear program. Syria’s Ambassador to Washington, Imad Moustapha, remarked that, “This is a fantasy. I hope the truth will be revealed to everybody... This will be a major embarrassment to the U.S. administration for a second time—they lied about Iraqi WMDs and they think they can do it again.” [25] The newspaper of the governing Baath party, Al-Baath, similarly recalled the now discredited public briefings regarding alleged Iraqi WMD:

“When you look at these pictures... a single image comes to mind — that of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell accusing Iraq of hiding weapons of mass destruction and presenting as proof a dossier of photographs…Of course Mr. Powell later acknowledged that he had been fooled by the U.S. intelligence services and by conservatives within the administration...The new U.S. campaign of lies should surprise nobody—it’s a continuation of the same policy of U.S. pressure against Syria that’s been going on for the past five years….” [26]

President al-Assad also denied that Syria had been constructing a nuclear reactor. He rhetorically asked an interviewer for the Qatari daily Al-Watan: “Does it make sense that we would build a nuclear facility in the desert and not protect it with anti-aircraft defenses?... A nuclear site exposed to (spy) satellites, in the heart of Syria and in an open space?...We don’t want a nuclear bomb... Where would we use it?... War in the region will effectively remain conventional.” [27]

Indeed, the one constant in the diverse responses of Syrian government representatives regarding the incident has been the resolute denial that Syria had been constructing a covert nuclear facility at the target site, with or without North Korean, Iranian, or other foreign assistance. Before and even after the September 6 incident, many nuclear nonproliferation experts believed that the Syrian government lacked the financial and technical resources to undertake a nuclear weapons program. [28] If North Korea provided Syrian technicians with nuclear technologies, fissile materials, or other assistance, however, some of these economic and technical barriers to Syria’s entry into the nuclear club could weaken.

The continued absence of an official response from Arab governments regarding the affair, despite the recent U.S. revelations, is particularly striking. These officials would presumably readily criticize an Israeli military strike on a neighboring Arab country, especially if they could make the argument that the attack had not been provoked. At least some observers have interpreted the silence of Arab governments regarding the matter as implying support for the action—something they cannot explicitly indicate due to domestic pressures against supporting Israel. [29]

In recent years, Syria’s ties with Iran as well as its support for terrorist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah have alienated several Arab governments, most prominently in the Sunni Arab countries of Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. These moderate regimes support rival forces in Lebanon and Palestine, seek to limit Iran’s regional influence, and maintain relatively warm relations with the United States. Syria’s isolation might have originally encouraged its government to bolster its defense capacities through the pursuit of unconventional weapons. In any case, a senior U.S. official said one purpose of releasing U.S. intelligence regarding the September 6 incident was to generate pressure on Damascus to moderate its policies regarding Iraq, Lebanon, and other regional hotspots. [30]

Six Party Talks on Korea Proceed as Before
Concern surrounding the possible disruption of the Six Party Talks on Korean Denuclearization, at a time when the prickly North Koreans appeared more cooperative than usual, likely also motivated the Bush administration’s unusually lengthy silence regarding the September 6 incident. After years of complex negotiations, on October 5, 2007, the various parties reached an agreement outlining U.S. promises for economic and humanitarian aid and diplomatic concessions in return for a North Korean pledge to disable its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, provide information about its past nuclear programs, and commit “not to transfer nuclear materials, technology, or know-how.” [31]

The recent revelations of alleged Syrian-North Korean nuclear connections have cast doubt on Pyongyang’s past adherence to this last condition. Through various U.N. resolutions and other measures, moreover, the international community had termed such transfers impermissible even before October 2007. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718, adopted on October 14, 2006, for example, obliges signatories to prevent North Korean citizens from providing technical training, advice, services, or assistance regarding nuclear materials on the trigger list of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The resolution also prohibited North Korea from transferring NSG-governed items or assisting other parties to violate NSG export controls.

Until recently, U.S. officials adhered to a cautious, careful, and complex line regarding the alleged North Korean-Syrian nuclear link. On one hand, while declining to accuse the North Koreans publicly of assisting a possible Syrian nuclear weapons program, administration representatives obliquely warned Pyongyang against transferring WMD-related materials and technologies to third parties. On the other, administration officials have also repeatedly argued that the best method to deal with the North Korean proliferation threat is through continuing the Six Party Talks.

The April 2008 U.S. intelligence briefings occurred only after Members of Congress threatened to oppose implementation of the October 2007 North Korean denuclearization deal unless they received more information from the administration about Pyongyang’s proliferation activities. [32] Congress would need to approve lifting sanctions on North Korea as well as to fund U.S. government programs relating to the agreement’s implementation. [33] In an April 29 news conference, President Bush maintained that one of the reasons he authorized the release of the intelligence about North Korean-Syrian nuclear cooperation was to communicate “to the North Koreans, to make it abundantly clear that we may know more about you than you think.” [34]

The recent intelligence revelations do not appear to have disrupted the Six Party Talks or affected Pyongyang’s implementation of the October 2007 agreement. The North Korean government failed to provide a complete inventory of its nuclear program by the original December 31, 2007 deadline, but Pyongyang supplied the required data in May 2008. [35] In addition, North Korean and American officials reached a compromise whereby Pyongyang would simply “acknowledge” U.S. concerns about past allegations that North Korea had engaged in illicit uranium enrichment or contributed to nuclear weapons proliferation without confirming their accuracy. The Japanese and new South Korean governments remain uncomfortable with the proposed agreement, but for reasons other than the alleged ties between Pyongyang and Damascus.

The North Korean government has not formally commented on the latest U.S. intelligence revelations concerning its alleged nuclear ties to Syria, which could be interpreted as an application of the “acknowledgement” principle. A senior U.S. administration official told the media on April 24 that Pyongyang continued to assist Syria’s nuclear activities after the Israeli air strike, including a probable contribution to the post-strike damage assessment and dismantlement of the facility. [36] Christopher Hill, the State Department official in charge of the U.S. negotiating team at the Six Party Talks, has since stated that U.S. government analysts believe that such cooperation between North Korea and Syria has now ceased. [37]

IAEA Sidelined and Sullen
Like all non-nuclear weapons states, the Syrian government must apply international safeguards to any nuclear reactors operating on its territory, whether they function under civilian or military control. Syria has declared one small (30-kilowat) research reactor located near Damascus to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and has permitted recurring agency inspections of its operations. [38] In the past, Syrian government representatives appear to have unsuccessfully sought to acquire additional nuclear reactors from Argentina, Russia, and other countries. [39] Syria has also participated in several technical cooperation programs with the IAEA that might have provided knowledge and skills useful in conducting a rudimentary nuclear weapons program. [40]

Not surprisingly, then, following the intense media speculation that the September 6 Israeli air strike had targeted a nuclear facility, the IAEA formally asked Damascus and other governments to provide any information they might possess about undeclared nuclear activities in Syria. A September 15 statement succinctly summarized the agency’s initial position:

• “The IAEA has no information about any undeclared nuclear facility in Syria and no information about recent reports.
• We would obviously investigate any relevant information coming our way.
• The IAEA Secretariat expects any country having information about nuclear-related activities in another country to provide that information to the IAEA.
• The IAEA is in contact with the Syrian authorities to verify the authenticity of these reports.” [41]

The following month, a diplomatic source knowledgeable about IAEA activities indicated that the agency’s informal inquiries to Syrian officials shortly after the incident went unanswered. [42] As of early June, Syria agreed to allow IAEA inspectors into the country, but the scope of their investigation is still uncertain.

A U.S. intelligence team briefed the IAEA on the same day the administration shared the data with the Congress and the media. [43] The nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) empowers the IAEA—which Syria joined in 1963—to verify allegations that any non-nuclear weapon State party to the NPT is violating its provisions. [44] The agency then reports any contraventions to the 35-nation IAEA Board of Governors and, if necessary, to the UN Security Council, which can impose sanctions and adopt other response measures.

After receiving the new information from the United States, IAEA Director General Mohamed El Baradei issued a statement affirming that the agency “will treat this information with the seriousness it deserves” and would investigate the U.S claims. The document also noted that the Syrian government’s Safeguard Agreement with the IAEA requires Damascus “to report the planning and construction of any nuclear facility to the Agency.” [45]

Not surprisingly, IAEA representatives are concerned that the Syrian government might have initiated construction of a nuclear reactor without informing the agency. Since the 1990-91 Gulf War revealed that Iraqi authorities had been able to conceal an extensive nuclear weapons program, many observers have complained about the inadequacies of IAEA monitoring mechanisms. In a January 8, 2008 interview with Al Hayat, El Baradei said IAEA experts had concluded, on the basis of satellite imagery, that the site probably did not house a nuclear reactor, an assessment now challenged by the U.S. intelligence claims. [46]

Nevertheless, the IAEA press release added that, “The Director General deplores the fact that this information was not provided to the Agency in a timely manner” and “views the unilateral use of force by Israel as undermining the due process of verification that is at the heart of the nonproliferation regime.” [47] This wording reaffirmed past protests by El Baradei about the manner in which Israel and the United States responded to the evidence of a possible Syrian nuclear program—choosing to employ military means while declining, even after the air strike, to cooperate with the agency to verify the accuracy of the intelligence.

El Baradei and other IAEA staff would evidently have preferred if the two governments had collaborated with the agency beforehand in an attempt to induce Syria to clarify or abandon its suspect activities, either through a public airing of the concerns or through UN Security Council actions. Some non-governmental nonproliferation experts, such as Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association and former Iraq WMD inspector Scott Ritter, concur in that assessment. [48] Failing that, the IAEA would have liked a timely elucidation of the considerations that prompted Israel to act. El Baradei, evidently concerned about a lack of confidence in Washington and Israel about his agency’s ability to enforce the NPT regime, complained to U.S. Undersecretary of State John Rood about what he considered to be an unnecessary seven-month delay in Washington’s provision of its intelligence data. [49]

Unanswered Questions
While the recent revelations may shed light on what actually transpired on September 6, they leave unresolved many important questions concerning motivation and consequences.

First, even if the U.S. intelligence assessment is correct, it remains unclear why the Syrian leadership might have wanted a nuclear reactor. Were Syrian officials simply trying to develop a “hedging” option to pursue nuclear weapons in the future or had they already committed to obtaining a nuclear arsenal and were seeking foreign assistance to accelerate its acquisition? In either case, were Syrian authorities primarily driven by defensive considerations—seeking leverage to induce Israel into peace negotiations? Or, was Damascus striving for a nuclear shield behind which to hide while employing Hezbollah as a surrogate or using conventional weapons directly against Israel?

Second, why would North Korea engage in such a risky enterprise? Was Pyongyang simply trying to earn some money? Or were North Korean officials attempting to conceal nuclear weapons assets and technologies in a friendly Middle Eastern country while it underwent international inspections of its nuclear holdings as part of the Six-Party agreement? As noted above, the U.S. intelligence briefers cited “cash” as Pyonyang’s main consideration, but they have not made public the information supporting this conclusion, which has been challenged by a vocal minority of critics of the Six Party deal.

Third, did Israeli officials resort to their traditional practice of preempting emerging threats—as with the decision to launch a similar air strike in 1981 against Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor? Or, did Israeli authorities hope to demonstrate to Tehran Israel’s will and capacity—both of which had come under question as a result of the country’s unexpectedly poor military performance during the summer 2006 War in Lebanon—to conduct a similar strike against Iran? In explaining his decision to release a portion of U.S. intelligence regarding the September 6 incident, President Bush cited “an interest in sending a message to Iran” as well as the broader international community “about just how destabilizing...nuclear proliferation would be in the Middle East.” [50]

Fourth, it is unclear whether, at this point, on-site inspection by the IAEA of Al Kibar would provide conclusive proof of U.S. intelligence assessments. The Syrian government has dismantled the facility, already heavily damaged by the Israeli air strike, and started new construction on the ruins. In addition, since it does not appear that radioactive materials were present at the site at the time of the attack, the IAEA could not apply standard environmental sampling or other means to confirm suspicions that Syria intended to operate a nuclear reactor there. [51] Nevertheless, El Baradei stated in January, even after the Syrians bulldozed the site, that his agency possessed “technologies to assure that the location did not host a nuclear facility.” [52]

Fifth, Bush administration representatives—including the president—have offered a range of reasons for the timing of the decision to authorize the comprehensive briefing. These include pressuring Syria to moderate its foreign policies, inducing North Korea to be more forthcoming in its nuclear accounting, and discouraging Iran and other potential proliferators from believing they can conceal illicit WMD activities. Skeptics have argued that the administration feared the information was about to leak, that the U.S. intelligence community was hoping to enhance its reputation following WMD-related embarrassments regarding Iraq and Iran, and that the embattled Israeli government (which had to approve the release of the intelligence it provided) was seeking indirectly to publicize a military success through its American allies. Others suggest the Bush team was hoping to weaken congressional opposition to the North Korean denuclearization deal, which could prove to be its most positive foreign policy legacy. Although these explanations are not mutually exclusive, some presumably were of greater importance, at least for certain key U.S. policy makers.

Finally, how will the recent revelations—as well as the entire episode—affect larger nuclear nonproliferation trends? Will the robustness of the Israeli response, the effectiveness of Israeli and U.S. intelligence, and the tacit support of many other governments for Israel’s forceful response make Syria, North Korea, and Iran less inclined to violate nonproliferation norms in the future? Or, will nuclear weapons aspirants interpret the limited costs suffered so far by Damascus and Pyongyang as a sign that, even if potentially subject to extraordinary actions like a unilateral air strike (which might not work in less optimal conditions than those prevailing last September), they ran manageable risks and would likely suffer limited and bearable consequences in violating international WMD nonproliferation commitments?

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute