Over the past two years, some half dozen states in the Middle East and North Africa have announced plans to begin or resume nuclear energy programs. (To view articles detailing these announcements, see archived WMD Insights stories under the “Middle East” on the WMD Insights homepage). A crucial factor that will help determine the proliferation risks posed by these emerging nuclear energy programs is whether they are built around nuclear fuel cycles that include indigenous uranium enrichment or reprocessing (plutonium separation) capabilities. These capabilities can provide fuel for nuclear power reactors, but they also can be used to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.

Iran’s 18-year secret pursuit of a uranium enrichment capability (until the effort was exposed in late 2002) and its continued development of this technology as part of its ostensibly civilian nuclear energy program have raised grave international concerns about potential misuse of this technology for the production of nuclear arms. Because Iran was a party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and was therefore required to disclose all its nuclear activities, its history of clandestine nuclear development has led the UN Security Council to adopt three resolutions demanding that Iran cease its enrichment and reprocessing activities and imposing economic sanctions on it until it does so. Article IV of the NPT grants parties the right to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but Tehran’s past secret activities and continuing questions about its intentions have led the international community to demand that Iran freeze all nuclear activities that could enable it to produce fissile material.

Indeed, because of the proliferation risks associated with the spread of fissile material production capabilities, in 2004, President George W. Bush called upon states that do not currently possess uranium enrichment or reprocessing facilities to refrain from acquiring them. [1] A far more proliferation-resistant alternative is a fuel cycle based on importing enriched uranium fuel from advanced supplier countries and storing spent fuel without reprocessing, a practice that has been widely adopted in industrializing states around the world.

A series of official announcements in recent months has provided new details about the contrasting attitudes of Algeria and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on the one hand, and Egypt, on the other, regarding the nuclear fuel cycle.

All three countries are non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT, which requires them to place all their nuclear facilities under inspection by the IAEA. The IAEA has encouraged all such states to grant the agency expanded monitoring rights by ratifying an amendment, known as an Additional Protocol, to their IAEA inspection agreements. Past and more recent announcements by Algeria, the UAE, and Egypt provide insights regarding their attitudes toward this important nonproliferation measure, with Egypt’s views again contrasting with those of the two other Arab states.

Algeria
In January 2008, alluding to Algeria’s nuclear fuel cycle plans, Algerian Minister of Energy and Mining, Chakib Khelil, explained that the decision to develop nuclear energy “required ample studies of the power tariff, the state’s role in subsidizing the prices, importing the enriched uranium [to fuel a reactor], the extent of dependency on the source of the material, and the treatment of [nuclear] waste.” [2] The statement is significant because it appears to signal that Algeria is not currently planning to develop a domestic uranium enrichment capability. Rather, it appears that Algeria will import enriched uranium from abroad. (Khelil’s statement offered little information, however, as to how Algeria plans to manage its spent nuclear fuel, i.e., whether it will store the fuel intact or reprocess it, a matter that will bear further monitoring.)

Algeria’s signing of two nuclear cooperation accords with China on March 24, 2008 suggests that China could well be the intended source of fuel for Algeria’s nuclear power program. The World Tribune reported that one agreement is for Chinese assistance in the construction and operation of a nuclear power reactor in Algeria and the second is for the training of “Algerian nuclear personnel.” [3] Algerian Radio emphasized that the agreements pertain to the use of nuclear energy for “peaceful purposes” and are just two of many cooperative efforts the countries hope to pursue. [4] Speaking on the day of the signing, Algerian Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem affirmed China’s importance to Algeria, saying, “We hope China would [sic] play a bigger role in international and regional affairs.” [5]

Algeria, home to the world’s tenth largest uranium reserves, has only recently expressed interest in the development of a civilian nuclear power program. [6] In 2007, Algiers signed preliminary nuclear cooperation agreements with Russia (in January, on training nuclear technicians and constructing nuclear power plants in Algeria); the United States (in June, to explore nuclear energy options); and France (in December, establishing a framework for future cooperation on nuclear energy, possibly including construction of nuclear power plants). [7] Energy and Mining Minister Khelil has also met with nuclear officials in Iran to discuss prospects for collaboration between the two nations. [8] However, although the details of the Chinese accords have not been disclosed, media reports indicate that these deals are unique among all of the recent agreements in that they specifically provide for Algeria’s acquisition of its first nuclear power reactor. [9]

This is not the first time Beijing and Algiers have collaborated on the development of an Algerian nuclear reactor. In 1983, China secretly agreed to supply Algeria with a 15-megawatt research reactor known as “El Salam.” [10] When the project was discovered, Algeria insisted that the reactor would be used to support medical research and generate electricity. The project, however, raised international concern because the reactor was also well-suited for the production of high quality, weapons-usable plutonium. Moreover, Algeria was not then a party to the NPT, and had not indicated that it would voluntarily place “El Salam” under IAEA safeguards to ensure that the reactor was used exclusively for peaceful purposes. [11] In the face of intense international pressure, Algiers subsequently agreed to place the reactor under IAEA safeguards before it became operational in 1993. Two years later, in 1995, Algeria joined the NPT, which requires it, as a non-nuclear weapon state, to place all nuclear facilities under IAEA monitoring. [12]

Algeria’s nuclear cooperation with China under the 2008 agreements appears to be considerably less controversial. Algeria’s history of nuclear dealings with Beijing may have given it confidence that it would be dealing with a reliable supplier of enriched uranium fuel, reducing its anxieties about its “dependency on the source of the material.”

Algeria has not yet signed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA permitting expanded inspections. However, in March 2005, Noureddine Bendjaballah, head of Algeria’s Atomic Energy Commission, announced that Algeria intended to take this step. “Major work is under way” toward the signing, he said, adding, “We have instructions to move very quickly, but I can’t give a timetable.” [13]

Most recently, on April 17, 2008, El-Khabar reported that “Mr. Khelil has announced a new bill related to nuclear power pacific use, which will be submitted to both Government and Parliament in the few upcoming days.” [14] Officials in Algeria estimate that it will be 10 to 15 years before the country can expect to see the benefits of a nuclear power program. [15]

UAE
On March 23, 2008, just a day before Algeria and China signed their nuclear cooperation agreements, the UAE cabinet approved Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan’s memorandum regarding development of a peaceful nuclear energy program for the country. A month later, on April 20, 2008, the UAE publicly disclosed details of the memorandum, which show concern for the same issues addressed by Algerian Energy Minister Chakib Khelil. [16] The UAE had previously signed nuclear cooperation agreements with France, in December 2007 and in January 2008 – the latter providing for the purchase of two nuclear power plants – and subsequently signed a general Memorandum of Understanding on nuclear cooperation with the United States on April 21. [17]

While Algeria has implicitly indicated that it was not planning to develop a domestic uranium enrichment capability, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan explicitly declared that “the Government of the UAE has…adopted a policy renouncing the development of any domestic enrichment or reprocessing capabilities in favor of long-term arrangements for the external supply of nuclear fuel.” [18] He went on to announce that the UAE would also conclude an Additional Protocol with the IAEA, providing the agency enhanced inspection authority. [19]

Significantly, Zayed Al Nahyan made clear that the UAE had deliberately adopted policies that would provide reassurance of its commitment to nonproliferation and to the exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy. The UAE, he stated, after extensive consultations with the United States and other states, had adopted a set of guiding principles, including:

1. complete operational transparency,
2. the highest standards of nonproliferation,
3. the highest standards of safety and security,
4. close coordination with the IAEA,
5. cooperation with the governments and firms of responsible nuclear supplier nations, and
6. a commitment to long-term sustainability. [20]

In effect, the UAE appears to recognize that the expansion of nuclear energy programs in the Middle East is perceived internationally as carrying with it the potential threat of further proliferation. Through added transparency and the explicit adoption of a proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycle, the Emirates appear to be seeking to allay such concerns to the extent possible. It is not known whether the UAE stance will be adopted by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – a regional bloc of Persian Gulf nations, including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman – which in 2007 decided to pursue a peaceful nuclear power program of its own. (For a history of the GCC’s pursuit of nuclear technology, see “Gulf Cooperation Council Moves Forward with Nuclear Energy Plans,” WMD Insights, April 2007.)

Egypt
In September 2006, Egypt announced plans to revive the country’s dormant nuclear power program. [22] Although the country currently operates only two small research reactors, Egyptian leaders have called for the completion of Egypt’s first nuclear power plant within a decade. During the tenure of President Gamal Abdul Nasser from 1952 to 1967, Egypt is believed to have sought to acquire nuclear weapons. The effort was abandoned by his successor, Anwar Sadat, during whose term Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel, joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, and signed a comprehensive inspection agreement with the IAEA. [23]

Egypt has taken a decidedly different tone from that of Algeria and the UAE in characterizing its planned nuclear energy program, which was announced by Jamal Mubarak, the son of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak on September 19, 2006. [24] In part because Egypt has long considered itself a leader of the Arab world, the Mubarak regime has been criticized at home for failing to respond to the implicit nuclear threat posed in the region by non-Arab Iran. [25] Thus, in announcing the renewal of Egypt’s nuclear energy program, Jamal Mubarak characterized it as “a national project that proves to us that we are strong and capable of doing something fitting of the grandeur of a country that some have begun to doubt.” [26] The Mubarak regime is also under domestic pressure to develop a counter to Iran, with one opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood, explicitly calling for Egypt to develop nuclear weapons. [27]

Egypt’s development of a peaceful nuclear energy program, while not in itself necessarily a precursor to the country’s development of nuclear weapons, would create an infrastructure and a cadre of trained specialists that would enhance Egypt’s ability to pursue such a course in the future, should circumstances warrant. Additionally, Egypt has long been embittered by the fact that, while it is a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT and has renounced nuclear weapons, neighboring Israel is outside the treaty and is widely believed to have nuclear arms.

Apparently reflecting such concerns – and, possibly, the fear that the building in the Syrian desert destroyed by Israel in September 2007 housed a clandestine nuclear reactor, implying that Syria had been pursuing a secret nuclear weapon program – in December 2007 Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister Ramzy Ezzedine Ramzy appeared to indicate that, as its nuclear program evolved, Egypt intended to develop an indigenous uranium enrichment capability. Stating that “in reality, the Nonproliferation Treaty doesn’t prohibit nuclear activities, including enrichment, as long as these activities remain peaceful and under the supervision of the [International Atomic Energy] Agency,” Ramzy declared, “We reject any move to make Egypt’s nuclear program largely dependent on foreign components.” [28]

Ramzy further asserted that, “Egypt will not sign the Additional Protocol, since it’s a voluntary thing. In comparison with Israel, which chooses to stay outside international legitimacy and not join the Nonproliferation Treaty, Egypt will not accept any additional commitment.” [29] Egypt reiterated this stance at the Preparatory Commission to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which met in Geneva in late April 2008, declaring:

Egypt rejects any attempts to impose additional obligations on non-nuclear weapon states, which are already in compliance with their commitments pursuant to the Treaty, if they are not reciprocated by equal and commensurate measures by states that still lie outside the treaty and are not bound by Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. [30]

The statement, though it followed the UAE’s very different pronouncement, did not elicit comment from other participating states. Indeed, although many states have yet to adopt an Additional Protocol to their safeguards agreements with the IAEA, Egypt appears to be one of very few states that have openly rejected this measure.

Conclusions
Ramzy’s December 2007 comments regarding the nuclear fuel cycle and the Additional Protocol stand in sharp contrast to the plans announced by Algeria and the UAE. It remains to be seen whether Egypt will adhere to its current stance as its nuclear energy program evolves. Although it has strongly hinted that it may attempt to produce enriched uranium nuclear power plant fuel domestically, in view of Egypt’s weak industrial base, Cairo would have little choice but to purchase nuclear power reactors from a foreign supplier. Given the volatility of the Middle East, many such suppliers would be likely to condition any future reactor sale to Egypt on Cairo’s accepting additional nonproliferation restraints. Indeed, all members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group but one have supported making acceptance of the Additional Protocol a condition of future nuclear trade. [31]

In the meantime, with two distinctive positions on the nuclear fuel cycle and the Additional Protocol now on the table, other Middle Eastern states, as they develop their nuclear energy programs, will need to choose between these alternatives. An additional development that could affect thinking on these issues is the new information released by the United States in late April 2008 indicating that the Syrian facility destroyed by Israel in September 2007 was a nuclear reactor modeled on the one used by North Korea to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. [32] (For more information on the Syrian developments, see New Insights about 2007 Israeli Air Strike in Syria in this month’s issue of WMD Insights.) Syria’s secret construction of the facility strongly suggests that Damascus has been pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapon program since at least 2001, when work on the reactor project began. This episode, taken together with Iran’s continuing pursuit of a suspect uranium enrichment capability, could lead other regional states to pursue nuclear energy strategies that avoid foreclosing future options to build sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities of their own and that deflect added IAEA monitoring. Whether other Middle Eastern states opt for such ambiguous postures, akin to that of Egypt, or the more extensive constraints endorsed by Algeria and the UAE could have a significant impact on future proliferation trends.

Leonard S. Spector and Benjamin Radford - James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies