A major U.S. objective at both the April 2-4 NATO summit in Bucharest and the April 5-6 bilateral Russian-American meeting at Sochi was to overcome international concerns about Washington’s plans to deploy ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. At the April 2-4 summit, NATO governments offered a surprisingly strong endorsement of U.S. BMD plans. In contrast, the Sochi meeting made clear that U.S.-Russian differences over missile defense persist despite recent U.S. diplomatic efforts to overcome Moscow’s concerns.

Background to Bucharest
The United States is currently seeking to deploy forward elements of its national missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. In particular, Washington wants to place ten interceptor missiles in Poland and an advanced BMD battle management radar in the Czech Republic. This “third site” would complement existing BMD deployments at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and Fort Greeley in Alaska. The United States would fund the entire cost of developing, deploying, and operating these installations. Other NATO governments have not directly participated in the bilateral negotiations over these facilities, which in each case involve both an agreement to host the U.S. facility and a separate Status of Forces Agreement. [1] The latter accord would define the legal status of the American personnel working at the bases.

In their pre-summit statements, U.S. officials argued that NATO should endorse the deployments because they will contribute to the defense of many European countries. [2] Czech leaders have also sought to stress the value of any Czech-based BMD system in defending the rest of Europe. When the U.S. and the Czech Republic announced the conclusion of their bilateral negotiations on April 2, the two governments stressed the contribution of their agreement to NATO’s collective defense mission: “In addition to deepening our bilateral strategic relationship, we strongly believe that our cooperation in this area will make a substantial contribution to NATO’s collective capability to counter existing and future threats in the 21st century, and will be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defense architecture.” [3]

Polish leaders have also sought to place their BMD initiative with Washington within a multilateral context by linking the planned U.S. systems with Europe’s emerging missile defense architecture. “While the U.S. project goes on, NATO should also set its missile defense programs on track so that interoperability and complementarity of the systems can be achieved,” Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski observed in February 2008. “We could not like either of them…to become hostage to the other. Similar levels of security for all allies can be guaranteed only if the two are properly integrated.” [4] On the eve of the summit, Polish Defense Minister Bogdan Klich complained about NATO’s lack of resolve in committing to establish a shorter-range BMD system to supplement the planned American forward-based systems: “For the moment, I don’t see sufficient political or financial will in some NATO states to put in place a continental missile system under the NATO banner that will complement the US missile shield.” [5]

None of the three national capitals is claiming that the BMD systems proposed for Poland and the Czech Republic will protect all NATO members. Due to the limited capabilities of the planned systems as well as time and distance factors, BMD assets stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic might not be able to identify, track, and intercept a ballistic missile launched by Iran at a nearby NATO ally located in southeastern Europe, which could include Bulgaria, Greece, Romania or Turkey. [6]

NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer has emphasized the importance of ensuring that all member countries are covered by missile defenses. He has sought to promote closer linkages among various NATO BMD initiatives to create a comprehensive BMD architecture that would avoid potential security inequities among members. “We have the sacred principle in NATO of the principle of indivisibility of security,” he explained two weeks before the summit. “We have no A league or B league in NATO. Every NATO ally is entitled to the same kind of protection.” [7]

The June 2007 NATO Defense Ministers’ meeting in Brussels had authorized a comprehensive study to assess how the planned American systems might affect NATO’s own separate multilateral BMD initiatives. A particular concern of the study was to evaluate how the alliance might collectively develop and deploy a shorter-range BMD system near Iran to provide protective cover for NATO countries within striking distance of that country. De Hoop Scheffer referred to this system as a possible “bolt-on” to “the U.S. third site.” [8] NATO officials had hoped that the allied governments would use the study findings to reach an actual deployment decision at the Bucharest summit. [9] By the time of the Bucharest meeting, however, it had become clear that certain issues still required resolution before the allies would commit to deploying a shorter-range system. Some of these questions were technical, such as how best to deal with countermeasures; some were economic, such as how to share costs among allies; and some were political, especially how non-NATO members might respond to the alliance’s BMD activities. [10] With respect to the latter point, an important factor affecting NATO’s BMD policies has been overcoming Russia’s strenuous opposition to the Polish and Czech deployments.

The NATO Summit
On April 3, the heads of state and government participating in the Bucharest summit issued a declaration affirming interest in employing missile defenses as one instrument in NATO’s multi-dimensional efforts to counter the “increasing threat” posed to members’ forces, territories, and populations by the proliferation of ballistic missiles. “We therefore recognise the substantial contribution to the protection of Allies from long range ballistic missiles to be provided by the planned deployment of European-based United States missile defence assets,” paragraph 27 states. “We are exploring ways to link this capability with current NATO missile defence efforts as a way to ensure that it would be an integral part of any future NATO-wide missile defence architecture.” Citing “the principle of the indivisibility of Allied security as well as NATO solidarity,” the NATO heads of state and government instructed the NATO Council in Permanent Session “to develop options for a comprehensive missile defence architecture to extend coverage to all Allied territory and populations not otherwise covered by the United States system.” The statement also indicated that the allied governments sought to complete this analysis of alternatives by next year’s NATO Summit “to inform any future political decision.”

At the same time, the Bucharest declaration stated that NATO members “are committed to maximum transparency and reciprocal confidence building measures” to alleviate Russian concerns about the system. The summit communiqué also urged the Kremlin “to take advantage of United States missile defence cooperation proposals” and affirmed NATO’s willingness to consider future BMD cooperation with Moscow: “we are ready to explore the potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile defence systems at an appropriate time.” [11]

Russian-American BMD Dialogue Before Sochi
When George Bush announced his plans to meet with Vladimir Putin after the NATO summit in a March 26 White House interview with foreign journalists, he termed the presidential meeting “a follow-up” to the March 17-18 engagement between senior U.S. and Russian national security leaders in Moscow. [12] At this latest “2+2” meeting, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, and Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov refrained from the public denunciations that had characterized recent high-level encounters on the missile defense issue. Lavrov even termed the new confidence-building measures put forward by Rice and Gates as “important and useful” attempts to address Russian security concerns about the placement of U.S. BMD systems close to Russia’s borders. [13]

Nevertheless, Russian leaders reaffirmed their opposition to the planned deployments. Lavrov continued to argue at the 2+2 session in favor of Moscow’s alternative proposals to establish some kind of joint U.S.-NATO-Russian BMD architecture for Europe. At a joint press conference involving all four senior officials, he commented: “The United States has put forward a plan to set up the third site in Europe. For us, this site creates risk, and President Putin, instead, proposed an alternative, which will bring together the United States, Russia and European countries and which will create no risks at all.” [14] On March 27, Lavrov again observed that, while Moscow was willing to negotiate, Russian policy makers nevertheless remained “convinced that the best way to assuage Russia’s concerns...will be to abandon such plans and turn to a truly collective project.” [15]

Lavrov was referring to various Russian proposals made by Putin last summer to share data with Washington from the Russian-operated early warning radars located at Gabala in Azerbaijan and Armavir in Russia’s North Caucasus. At the June 2007 G-8 Summit in Germany, Putin offered to provide the United States with unprecedented access to intelligence on Iranian missile developments from the Russian-leased Gabala radar station in return for Washington’s promise to freeze its planned Czech and Polish deployments. At the July 2007 Kennebunkport summit, Putin additionally told Bush that the United States could also use a nearly constructed BMD radar in southern Russia, located in Krasnodar Territory, about 700 km northwest of Iran. [16] The Russian president also proposed establishing an ambitious pan-European BMD architecture that would integrate NATO and Russian defenses against common missile threats. Putin further called for the revival of the Moscow-based Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) and the establishment of a similar joint early warning data center in Brussels in order to involve other NATO governments more fully in the management of the proposed pan-European BMD architecture. Despite their strong opposition to the U.S. national BMD systems intended for Poland and the Czech Republic, Russian political and military leaders have continued to express interest in cooperating with NATO on theater BMD. In January 2008, NATO and Russia conducted their fourth joint NATO-Russia Theatre Missile Defense exercise, a computer-based simulation, in Ottobrunn, near Munich. [17]

Although the Bush administration expressed interest in accessing the information from the Gabala and Armavir radars, it has been unwilling to accept Putin’s condition that the United States suspend its eastern European deployments in exchange. American officials maintained that, while the Russian radars might be able to supply some data useful for assessing Iranian missile launches, they lacked the battle management capabilities of the X-Band radar planned for the Czech Republic or the ability to intercept any missile directed at Europe, as the Polish interceptors are designed to do.

For the last few months, American officials have instead presented their Russian counterparts with a series of proposals designed to assuage Russian security concerns about the planned Polish and Czech facilities. The envisaged confidence-building measures aim to increase the transparency of the BMD facilities’ operations to the Russian government as well as limit any theoretical threat they might pose to Russia’s own missile arsenal. Bush justified these reassurances by arguing that, since American BMD efforts are not directed at Moscow but at “a potential missile launch, for example, out of the Middle East,” the United States and its allies were “in a position if people so choose to share information” and ensure that the Russians “fully understand the operational activities of a system so as to build confidence.” [18] Similarly, White House National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley subsequently told reporters that, “The main issue there is to find a way, in concrete terms, to reassure Russia that the radar and missile installation that is planned in Poland and the Czech Republic are, as we say, about potential threats coming to Europe, coming to Russia, if you will, from the Middle East, and are not aimed at Russia.” [19]

Although the precise details of the American proposals remain unclear, U.S. and Russian officials have made various statements indicating their basic content. During the flight to Moscow, Gates and Rice told reporters that they had raised the idea that Russian personnel could, with the approval of the host governments, inspect operations at the BMD bases. Hadley later noted that Russian personnel on-site at the X-band radar base planned for the Czech town of Brdy “could see the radar is focused south, instead of east or north.” [20] According to media reports, the U.S. government has also offered to give Russian inspectors access to BMD sites on American territory. [21]

With regard to the ten missile interceptors planned for Poland as well as the radar, Gates said he explained to the Russian government that, “We were prepared not to operationalize the sites until we had had flight testing from Iran that showed a capability to threaten Europe.” [22] According to Russian sources, Washington had offered to refrain from placing the interceptors in their launch silos until then. [23]

In addition, Gates said he recognized that the Russian government might reasonably worry about “a breakout” during which the United States might vastly increase its missile defenses near Russia. “And I said we can negotiate limits that make sure that doesn’t happen without any kind of mutual consent.” [24]

Sochi Leaves Many Issues Unresolved
At his joint press conference with Bush, President Putin made a very deliberate statement about the BMD issue. For the first time, he declared that the transparency and confidence building measures offered by Washington could help decrease Russian anxieties about the planned U.S. deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. The Russian president added, however, that they could never overcome Moscow’s worries altogether:

I will not conceal that on a number of the most—one of the most difficult issues was, and remains, the issue of missile defense in Europe. This is not about language; this is not about diplomatic phrasing or wording; this is about the substance of the issue. I’d like to be very clear on this. Our fundamental attitude to the American plans have not changed. However, certain progress is obvious. Our concerns have been heard by the United States. In March at the 2-plus-2 meeting, and earlier today in my conversation with President Bush, we have been offered a set of confidence-building and transparency measures in the field of missile defense, and we can feel that the President of the United States takes a very serious approach here and is sincerely willing to resolve this problem.

We do support this approach, and certainly, in principle, adequate measures of confidence-building and transparency can be found. They can be important and useful in addressing these kind of issues. Thus, we now have room for cooperation, we’re ready for such interaction. As far as the concrete substance of the U.S. proposals, it is too early to speak about it at this point. It is up to the experts to discuss the technical details of these proposals, and it is up to them to make any final conclusions. And the alternative that we offered last year is still relevant. We hope that it will be an issue for discussion in the future. [25]

The U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration issued by Bush and Putin at the Sochi summit, whose clause on missile defense was only finalized during the April 5 opening dinner, [26] repeats this balanced language: “The Russian side has made clear that it does not agree with the decision to establish sites in Poland and the Czech Republic and reiterated its proposed alternative. Yet, it appreciates the measures that the U.S. has proposed and declared that if agreed and implemented such measures will be important and useful in assuaging Russian concerns.” [27]

The framework document includes a joint pledge by Russia and the United States to collaborate in the future to overcome their missile defense differences. It also expressed both governments’ “interest in creating a system for responding to potential missile threats in which Russia and the United States and Europe will participate as equal partners.” [28] Bush called this “a powerful and important strategic vision.” [29] Putin concurred, stating that, “if we manage to achieve this kind of level of cooperation on a global missile defense system, this will be the best kind of result for all our proceeding efforts.” [30] (For more information on the U.S.-Russian Framework Declaration, please see, “Bush and Putin Call for a Strategic Partnership” in this issue of WMD Insights.)

Nevertheless, Moscow and Washington continue to differ sharply over whether the U.S. BMD systems planned for Poland and the Czech Republic should be part of that global missile defense architecture. After hearing Putin’s statement cited above, Bush acknowledged that missile defense represents “an area where we’ve got more work to do to convince the Russian side that the system is not aimed at Russia.” [31] When asked by reporters after the summit whether he expected the two sides to reach a BMD agreement before Bush leaves office, Hadley remarked, “They can leave that to their prospective successors.” [32]

Unanswered Questions
One reason why it could take at least until the end of the year to resolve the Russian-American BMD dispute is that the confidence-building measures proposed by the United States raise several important questions whose answers will require detailed negotiations. President Putin himself, while professing “cautious optimism” about eventually reaching a U.S.-Russian agreement over European BMD, added that “the devil is in the details.” He noted they would require expert-level discussions “to agree on the concrete confidence-building measures, and they should see how those measures will be implemented in practical terms.” [33]

For example, Moscow’s role in determining whether Iran is capable of threatening Europe with missile attacks, which would justify activating the missile interceptors in Poland, remains unclear. The two sides have differed for years as to whether Iran presents a genuine threat. Russian analysts have long accused their American counterparts of exaggerating Iranian capabilities to justify stationing BMD systems in Europe that really aim to counter Russia’s own missile arsenal. At Sochi, Putin called for “equal democratic access to managing” any BMD architecture. [34] Although seeking a compromise with Moscow over the BMD issue, Secretary Gates remains adamant that he would not let Russia have “veto power” over when to activate the system. [35]

In addition, American officials have repeatedly pointed out that many of the proposed confidence-building measures would require the host governments’ approval. In Moscow, Gates observed: “it’s all dependent on reciprocity and the agreement of the Czechs and Poles to these arrangements.” [36] The initial American plans had envisaged allowing designated officials at the Russian embassies in Poland and the Czech Republic to conduct short-notice inspections of the BMD facilities. [37] At Sochi, Putin called for a transparency arrangement whereby Russian experts “should be present at those sites on a permanent basis.” [38] Dmitry Rogozin, Russian Ambassador to NATO, told a reporter that Moscow would formally negotiate the deployment of the U.S. systems in Poland and the Czech Republic only with Washington, not the two host countries. He termed “ridiculous” the idea of giving Polish or Czech representatives access to Russian military sites on Russian territory in return for their governments’ allowing Russian representatives to inspect the U.S. BMD sites in Eastern Europe. [39] On April 8, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov told Ekho Moskvy radio that the Russian government would insist on having a permanent military presence at the planned U.S. BMD sites in Poland and the Czech Republic in order to see “second-by-second” what is happening at the facilities. [40] He also called for Russia to engage in “reliable technical monitoring” at the sites, including on-site cameras and other sensors. [41]

Czech and Polish leaders have indicated they will drive a hard bargain for any inspection regime that involved Russian monitoring of sites on their territories. After Sochi, Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg told radio listeners that, “If they wish to discuss the possibility of occasional inspections at the base then the Russians and Americans will have to deal with us. We made it clear to both Moscow and Washington that we will not be bypassed in this matter.” [42] Czech Prime Minister Mirek Topolanek has indicated that he would consider granting access to the U.S. BMD facilities based on his territory, but only on a reciprocal basis. [43] Czech Deputy Prime Minister Alexandr Vondra told the daily Hospodarske noviny that “we are willing to negotiate about Russian inspections, but definitely not in the form of a permanent presence of Russian soldiers in the Czech Republic.” [44]

The Polish government has likewise insisted that Poland will only allow temporary inspections by Russian military personnel of U.S. BMD facilities on its soil. Before the Sochi meeting, Defense Minister Klich explained that, “A U.S. base—if it is built—will not be an exterritorial object, but will be fully controlled by Poland.” Klich also said that, under such an inspection regime, Poland would expect to receive reciprocal temporary inspection rights, ideally at Russian BMD sites. [45] A day after the Sochi summit, Deputy Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski, who is in charge of the Polish-Russian consultation talks on the BMD issue, made clear that a “Russian presence in Poland is out of the question. Such solutions had been resorted to in the past and will not be repeated.” [46]

What steps Washington might take to overcome Russian fears about a BMD breakout by the United States also remains uncertain. For example, it is unclear where any limits to future U.S. BMD deployments might apply, how long these might last, and whether they might restrict the joint BMD research and development programs the United States is conducting with foreign allies including Japan, Australia, and Israel. After the Moscow meeting, Lavrov reaffirmed his concerns to the Russian media that the United States would seek to deploy additional BMD systems in Turkey, Japan, and other regions around Russia’s periphery. Citing reports of U.S. interest in deploying BMD systems in Turkey, Russian analyst Nikita Petrov argued that “The problem is that Washington has never said when it intends to stop the deployment of its missile defense system.” [47]

More generally, it remains unclear how any measures would be enforced. In recent arms control negotiations, over BMD as well as other issues, Russian policy makers have rejected informal arrangements, insisting that the United States negotiate formal legally binding treaties. Lavrov observed that, “what matters in such cases is potential, not intentions.” [48] Russian leaders worry that a future Czech, Polish, or American government might simply decide to stop enforcing any informal understandings, confronting Moscow with a fait accompli. The extent to which Russia might become involved in any NATO BMD architecture also remains uncertain given that the dispute over the Polish and Czech systems has precluded detailed consideration of this issue.

Perhaps the greatest uncertainty is what will happen in Moscow. The Russian political system is experiencing an unprecedented transformation, which will preoccupy its leaders for at least the time of the transition. As planned, Dmitry Medvedev assumed the Russian Presidency on May 7; it is assumed that Putin will remain influential as Russia’s Prime Minister. Given his stated view that, under his leadership, Russia has successfully regained its great power status, Putin may resist efforts to moderate his confrontational arms control policies. It is also unclear whether Medvedev will pursue different national security policies even if empowered to do so. In his meeting with Rice and Gates, the Russian president-elect stressed that “we need to create a base for continuity in relations between Russia and the United States.” [49]

Conclusion: Explaining the Bucharest and Sochi Outcomes
In essence, the diverging BMD outcomes at the Bucharest and Sochi summits reflect the fact that recent U.S. diplomatic initiatives to reassure foreign governments about Washington’s BMD plans have proved sufficient to persuade most NATO governments but not Kremlin policy makers. Putting it differently, in the U.S.-Russian diplomatic battle for the support of European governments over BMD, Washington won.

American and Russian policy makers have long recognized the importance of shaping European attitudes on this issue. A poll conducted immediately before the Bucharest summit found public sentiment in NATO’s largest countries strongly opposed to the U.S. plans to deploy BMD systems in Poland and the Czech Republic. Opposition declined somewhat when respondents were asked to evaluate a cooperative NATO-Russian initiative. [50]

President Bush cited the need to assuage European concerns about the deterioration of Russian-American relations due to the BMD issue in explaining why he accepted President Putin’s invitation to meet at Sochi: “Romania and other nations would hope that the United States would have good relations with Russia…. I think a lot of people in Europe would have a deep sigh of relief if we’re able to reach an accord on missile defense. And hopefully we can.” [51] Speaking in Copenhagen en route to Bucharest, Secretary Gates explicitly noted the link between NATO and Russian concerns at a news conference: “To the degree there have been reservations among some here in western Europe about missile defense, in part it has been concern over the Russian reaction.” He then stressed the administration’s vigorous efforts to dampen such concerns. [52]

Russians have repeatedly voiced suspicions that their American interlocutors were simply trying to overcome European opposition to the deployments by seeking to show that Moscow refuses to reciprocate generous U.S. compromises. In February 2008, President Putin told Russian television viewers that the Americans saw their consultations with the Russian government as “merely an information and diplomatic cover for implementing their plans.” [53] More recently, some Russian defense analysts interpreted the Rice and Gates proposals as designed to “show their European allies that it is impossible to come to terms with ‘those Russians’-- we have been offering them this and that, but they just won’t agree to anything. Particularly, they want to emphasize this to those allies who are not happy about U.S. plans to defend itself with a missile shield.” [54]

The German, Polish, and other European governments have previously indicated that Russian opposition to U.S. BMD policies made them uneasy about endorsing the plans. Earlier this year, Foreign Minister Sikorski made clear his government’s unease about Moscow’s continuing hostility regarding the deployments: “The U.S. side has assured Warsaw that it will dispel Russia’s concerns. But that has yet to be done.” [55] When U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian affairs Daniel Fried later spent two days in Poland negotiating this issue, he took care to affirm that, “Poles have urged us to seek to work with Russia cooperatively on missile defense, and we have done so.” [56]

It appears that Washington’s sustained diplomatic engagement with Russia regarding BMD helped persuade other NATO governments that the United States has sincerely sought to resolve the Russian-American impasse over the issue. That both NATO in general and the Polish and Czech governments in particular now seem ready to accept the deployments may have persuaded Russian policy makers to tone down their opposition. From Russia’s perspective, since the U.S. BMD systems appears likely to be built regardless of Moscow’s opposition, the Russian government might as well cut its losses and negotiate the best agreement possible now, before its bargaining leverage erodes further. The Kremlin’s hard-line approach had been giving some credence to American complaints that their Russian interlocutors seemed to be hoping to delay the deployments in order to divide NATO members and wait until Bush, an ardent proponent of missile defenses, leaves office. [57] “We’ve put a lot on the table and now it’s time for them to reciprocate,” a frustrated Gates told reporters while traveling to Moscow. “At some point the Russians are going to have to decide whether they want to be true partners, which we are offering, or whether this is just all a sham game on their part to stall the whole deal.” [58]

Another possible reason for Moscow’s decision to tone down its opposition is that Russian strategists confront an even more immediate threat than the proposed U.S. BMD systems: NATO expansion. Moscow appears to have been caught off guard by the vigor with which the new Ukrainian government is seeking to join NATO, a development that led President Putin to threaten to redirect Russian nuclear missiles at Ukraine should it ever join the alliance. The government of Georgia has also made more progress in realizing its NATO aspirations than seemed possible a few months ago.

Unlike the BMD case, however, the U.S. diplomatic campaign seeking to persuade other NATO governments to give Georgia and Ukraine a Membership Action Plan (MAP) proved inadequate to overcome allied concerns about Moscow’s reaction to such a move. Rogozin praised the decision to defer granting them a MAP as demonstrating that “Russia has become a key participant in NATO’s decision making.” [59] Nonetheless, European desires to limit the scope of any transatlantic confrontation probably contributed to their decision to endorse the Bush administration’s missile defense plans—an implicit tradeoff between BMD and NATO expansion, even if Bush had ruled out such a deal with Moscow before his trip. [60]

Another, more cynical, motive may also be at work. Russian analysts have noted that, in the United States, Democratic leaders in Congress, as well as the two remaining Democratic presidential candidates, continue to express reservations about the deployments, leaving their eventual funding uncertain. [61] Kremlin policy makers may be hoping that deferring the issue until Bush leaves office could see the next U.S. administration abandon the project due to its high financial cost, technical uncertainties, and risks of further damaging relations with Russia. Building at the two sites could not begin sooner than next year even if both the Polish and Czech governments agree to the deployments and Congress begins funding their construction. [62]

The Bush Administration may have decreased the prospects of such a denouement, however, by securing the backing of NATO, the Czech Republic, and probably Poland for its proposed European missile defense architecture. An observation made by National Security Advisor Hadley while flying back from Sochi suggests that the Administration hopes the Russian government would come to accept the deployments de facto without ever officially agreeing to their presence: “[They] may never formally say, ‘We welcome these sites’. . . But you know, if the sites are built, and . . . Russians show up, liaison officials who . . . who work at the sites, you can decide in your own mind whether you think Russia has accepted the sites or not. I would argue that at that point they will have accepted those sites.” [63]

Richard Weitz – Hudson Institute