When delegates convened in The Hague for the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on April 7, 2008, few could have predicted the controversial circumstances that would surround its conclusion two weeks later. Given the planning and preparation preceding the Conference, the uncontroversial conduct of the First Review Conference, and the collegial atmosphere in which the CWC’s policy-making organs usually operate, most participants expected an uncontroversial outcome. That the conference almost ended in failure, only succeeding through the use of negotiating methods that alienated many delegations, is an outcome that will be assessed in The Hague and many national capitals for some time.

Background
Like most arms control treaties, the CWC requires its states parties to convene every five years to undertake “reviews of the operation” of the treaty during which they should specifically take into account “any relevant scientific and technological developments.” [2] The general aim of all such review conferences (RevCons) is to take stock of past activities and set the future agenda. The first CWC RevCon, which took place in April/May 2003, occurred in a context in which the preparations had been delayed and distracted by the aftermath of 9/11, a financial crisis in 2001-02, and the ousting of the first OPCW Director-General, José Bustani. [3] The conference opened in controversy with the United States accusing Iran of producing and stockpiling chemical weapons, and Iran – in return – accusing Washington of having equipped and supplied Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. [4] However, the rest of the conference proceeded constructively and the delegations completed their work more or less on schedule. In addition to adopting a comprehensive final report, the conference adopted two “action plans” – one supporting national implementation of the treaty and one promoting universal adherence. [5] The first CWC RevCon is generally regarded as a success and as having laid the foundations for the achievements of the OPCW since 2003.

Preparations for the Second RevCon began in July 2006 with a meeting of an open-ended working group chaired by UK ambassador Lyn Parker. This mechanism is unusual in arms control negotiations and is the product of the CWC’s specific provisions. The CWC differs from most other arms control treaties in that it has a permanent institution attached to it, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The existence of the organization and the regular cycle of meetings it holds obviates the requirement to convene a preparatory committee prior to RevCons, as occurs with the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Instead, preparatory work for CWC RevCons is carried out by an open-ended working group of CWC states parties meeting regularly in The Hague over an extended period prior to the conference.

Ambassador Parker’s working group represented the start of the CWC review process. It held regular meetings that were attended by around 40 delegations out of the 183 CWC states parties. The group covered all of the issues likely to be raised at the conference, such as the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons, universal adherence to the treaty, verification provisions – particularly regarding measures related to chemical industry – and organizational and financial matters. It did so, however, in a discursive fashion rather than in an attempt to negotiate agreed text. Although states parties continued to hold divergent views on several key issues, the working group provided a way for moving forward and allowed delegates to focus on longer-term issues rather than the day-to-day OPCW operations. The working group was aided by substantive reports from the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat and the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), as well as submissions from states parties. [6] The group’s deliberations were also informed by contributions from non-governmental organizations and the chemical industry. [7]

Shortly before the RevCon, Ambassador Parker circulated a draft report to states parties based on the working group’s discussions. [8] He issued it, however, under his authority as chair; it was not a consensus report. It was also a “clean text” with no square brackets indicating controversial text ; Parker wanted to avoid the impression that the small number of working group participants had begun negotiations before the conference. Some, especially Western delegations, considered the draft to be a useful contribution to the upcoming negotiations. Others felt that it did not adequately reflect their points of view; delegations from member states of the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) in particular were broadly dissatisfied. Ambassador Parker admitted that the text was more reflective of Western views, but said that this was mainly due to the late submission of comments by NAM states parties. The draft was submitted to the conference as an “aid to discussion” with no formal status. Ambassador Parker compared the review process to a mountaineering expedition with the working group having reached base camp. It was up to the RevCon itself, he contended, to reach the summit.

The Second Review Conference
The Second RevCon opened on April 7; it was attended by representatives from 114 states parties and chaired by Ambassador Waleed Ben Abdel Karim El Khereiji of Saudi Arabia. [9] The first days were marked by a sense that the meeting could achieve a positive result, with delegates using words like “consolidation”, “rebalancing” and “evolution”. There was a widespread view that no obvious issues risked derailing the proceedings. [10] In a positive contribution to this atmosphere, the general debate did not repeat the very public US-Iran discord in 2003. The US statement during the RevCon opening plenary session did not identify any suspected violators, perhaps indicating either a decision to be less confrontational or reduced confidence in intelligence assessments. [11] The Iranian statement, while containing a few pointed remarks aimed at the United States, was also less confrontational than expected. [12] (For more information on the expectations for the conference, see “Iran Likely to Take Accusatory Stance at CWC Review Conference” in April’s issue of WMD Insights.) In all, 50 plenary statements were made to the conference; many of them, however, were merely updates of national implementation activities and did not really acknowledge or address long-term and strategic questions. In addition, over 20 national working papers were submitted. Such submissions are useful in that they provide delegations with substantive analysis of technical issues, highlight particular questions of interest to a state party or group of states parties, flag potential challenges, and demonstrate a constructive engagement in the review process for those countries making the submissions. [13]

Procedural Dysfunction
With the conclusion of general debate, the conference closed its doors to outside observers and began negotiation of a final report. This took place through a traditional procedural mechanism in which delegations are constituted as a Committee of the Whole (CoW), which in this instance was chaired by Ambassador Benchaâ Dani of Algeria. The CoW took the “Parker text” as its starting point, laboriously working its way through paragraph by paragraph, adding new text and square brackets around contentious text. At the outset, considerable time was devoted to incorporating new text from NAM states that had been slow in tabling their proposals in the working group. By the end of the first week, it was clear that this painstaking procedure could not continue if the conference was to finish on time. Progress was slow partly because of the size of the CoW, but also because Ambassador Dani seemed unsure of how to run the CoW and because Iran resisted an early move to institute more effective negotiating mechanisms, such as the use of facilitators or friends of the chair. However, it was important that all delegations were given a chance to contribute, particularly given the small number who had participated in the open-ended working group. This first reading of the “Parker text” was finally finished on the Monday evening of the second week of the conference, only four days before the conference was to conclude. The inclusion of square-bracketed alternative text increased the draft report from 29 to 40 pages. Although difficult to compile, this square-bracketed text did serve as the basis for the later negotiations on the final report.

Following the completion of the first reading, new methods were needed to try to replace the square-bracketed text with text agreed by consensus. Ambassador Dani introduced facilitators to work on particular parts of the draft report in a smaller meeting room that limited the number of participants from each national delegation. However, progress was still too slow. Events came to a head on the penultimate day of the conference as enthusiasm dissipated and the threat of failure loomed. Drafting of the final report was taken over by a small group of roughly 20 states parties chaired by Ambassador El Khereiji, and all other delegations were excluded. [14] Ambassador Dani tendered his resignation as the chairman of the CoW, although it was not accepted. This so-called “other meeting” or “smaller group” worked throughout Friday until finally, following a well-worn practice in such negotiations of “stopping the clock” to provide time for further negotiation after the meeting was to have concluded, it produced an almost complete final report that was given to all delegates at 3:45am. Ambassador El Khereiji was able to secure unanimous agreement to the text and finally closed the conference at 6:05am on Saturday morning.

The way in which the final report was drafted provoked frustration among the many delegations excluded from the “other meeting”, most of which received no information as the talks proceeded. [15] The Philippines, for example, registered its “grave concern” at the “limited and closed negotiation process” and said clearly that “we do not want this unexpected move to be precedent setting. This should not happen again.” [16] Some participants argued, however, that this process was actually an improvement upon previous meetings at which the final outcome was decided by an even smaller group of states. At the first RevCon, for example, the UK, US, India and Iran conducted the critical negotiations. What was unusual at the Second RevCon was that the “other meeting” took responsibility for drafting the entire report, not only the contentious sections, as the most expeditious alternative to the dysfunctional system that the conference had introduced.

Issues
The conference worked its way through a number of key issues, sometimes satisfactorily, sometimes less so. While the references in the final report to some issues are less elaborate than those in the report of the First RevCon, they do not contradict the earlier report, or fall below the baselines that it set. Importantly, the Technical Secretariat did not gain or lose any privileges. An analysis of the issues relevant to the OPCW RevCon follows.

Science and Technology Developments
Taking account of developments in science and technology is a key task of the RevCon, so it is surprising that the final report pays them little attention, particularly when compared with the 2003 report and the “Parker text”. References to the general purpose criterion, the mechanism by which the CWC ensures both that all toxic chemicals, regardless of origin, are prohibited for weapons purposes and that the treaty keeps pace with advancing science and technology, were watered down. NAM states led these efforts, as they regard a focus on advancing science and technology with suspicion, seeing it as a concern primarily of developed countries keen to increase inspections in developing countries. In addition, India in particular insisted that a meeting of governmental experts be convened after the conference to consider the Scientific Advsiory Board’s report to the conference, which addressed a range of new scientific and technological developments since the First RevCon. In doing so, however, the Indian delegation was effectively arguing for the creation of a filter between the independent advice of the SAB and OPCW policy-making organs. [17] Some NAM states apparently regard the SAB as a “Trojan horse” for propelling the concerns of developed countries. Such a meeting of governmental experts could also be a way for some states parties to exert “ownership” over the SAB, which formally reports to the Director-General. Indian insistence on a filter, however, was strongly opposed by many other delegations.

Universality
Since 2003, significant strides have been made towards universal adherence to the CWC. At that time, 40 states had not yet joined the Convention. By the Second RevCon, in part through the active implementation of an action plan on universality agreed at the First RevCon, the treaty had 183 states parties and only 12 UN member states had not joined. Of the 12 remaining states, five attended the conference indicating their engagement with the OPCW and holding out the prospect of their membership in either the short or medium-term. [18] Indeed, Guinea-Bissau ratified the CWC four weeks after the RevCon concluded. The Review Conference commended the 2003 action plan to achieve universality, but it did not take any further concrete action. For the first time, however, it named hold-out states in its final report. [19]

Verified Destruction
Verified destruction of chemical weapons is a key feature of the CWC. A total of 40 per cent of declared chemical weapons have been destroyed. The five remaining possessor states have all been granted extensions of varying lengths to the original final deadline of April 2007 to destroy the remaining 60 percent. [20] It is widely expected that neither Russia nor the United States, the two largest stockpile holders, will meet their April 2012 deadlines, and both countries received some criticism during the meeting for the fact that they will likely miss a treaty-imposed obligation. However, a noticeable disparity existed between those states parties that saw destruction as the “primary focus” of the review conference and others who felt that it should be discussed closer to 2012. The final report urged the possessor states to meet the deadline, but its language was not particularly strong. It identified the verification of destruction as “one of the main activities” of the Technical Secretariat. [21]

Nonproliferation
In general, those states that wanted to give priority to destruction placed less emphasis on the nonproliferation aspects of the CWC. On nonproliferation, states parties split along North-South lines. In its revisions to the “Parker text” the NAM deleted every mention of “nonproliferation” while some developed countries regarded inclusion of nonproliferation as one of their negotiating “red lines” – those items that they insisted be included. Some NAM states parties also appear to link nonproliferation with science and technology and UN Security Council resolution 1540, to which they also objected. [22]

The issue impacted most on discussions around the balance of the OPCW’s verification activities. NAM countries insisted on reference to the “hierarchy of risks” which they believe is implicit in the CWC and focusing on facilities working with those chemicals traditionally deemed more directly related to chemical weapons. In contrast, developed countries wanted to focus more on “Other Chemical Production Facilities” (OCPFs) which work with a broader range of chemicals, and which these states deem to pose the greatest risk of future proliferation. Non-aligned states, which are home to many such facilities, argued that such a shift “would signal a departure from the fundamental principles of the verification regime”. [23] In his opening statement, the Director-General expressed his opinion that “the level of OCPF inspections still does not provide adequate nonproliferation assurances.” In the end, the final report offers something to both North and South in that it mentions “nonproliferation” twice, but also restates the different verification regimes established by the CWC for different facilities. Although the report does not go as far as some developed countries wanted on nonproliferation, many were surprised that a paragraph requesting the Director-General to report on the options for focusing inspections on those OCPFs of highest relevance to the CWC remained in the final draft. [24] Nonproliferation, particularly as it manifests itself in verification activities related to chemical production facilities, will undoubtedly be an issue of ongoing, and often intense, disagreement in the CWC context.

Riot Control Agents and Other Chemical Incapacitants
Riot control agents (RCAs) and chemicals that might be used as incapacitants were much discussed prior to the review conference, albeit largely outside of the OPCW where such discussion is politically sensitive. [25] However, the SAB did include the issue in its report, and a number of member states raised the issue in their opening national statements. Switzerland in particular pushed the issue, submitting a working paper that called on the conference to launch discussion of the ambiguities of the CWC regarding riot control agents and the lack of provisions pertaining to incapacitating agents. [26] The UK also supported discussions on the issue after the conference. [27] At one stage the draft report included joint Swiss-UK- US text that could have acted as a “hook” for such future work. US involvement was surprising given its earlier opposition to discussion of RCA issues, but Washington appears to have been reluctantly persuaded that some reference to the issue was necessary. However, the text was deleted at Iran’s insistence in the final hours of the conference, apparently because it did not refer specifically to incapacitating chemicals. [28] Given developments in science and technology and increasing interest in such weapons in some countries, some outside observers see this outcome as a “missed opportunity.” [29] Within the OPCW, however, not enough states parties have yet been convinced of the issue’s significance.

Conclusions
The Second CWC RevCon falls on the “success” rather than “failure” end of the spectrum of possible outcomes if one defines success in terms of producing an agreed final document. Even this limited “success,” however, was achieved only by ignoring or avoiding difficult issues or marginalizing most delegations – a high price to pay in terms of future political goodwill. Time pressures meant that considerable text was virtually copied from the First RevCon report. This text was often subsequently weakened, so the final outcome of the meeting represents only a modest success. The report does not weaken the CWC itself but it does little to advance issues that analysts and some states parties were keen to see addressed. A combination of factors contributed to this, primarily the increasing politicization of already complex issues, poor conference management, and intransigence on the part of certain delegations. On the latter point, while many may point the finger at Iran, it did not always operate alone, although it did on occasion even go against its NAM colleagues. Iran’s behaviour surprised some, as it did not make proposals in areas in which it had been expected to do so, for example, assistance to victims of chemical weapons. [30] In the short-term, CWC states parties need to rediscover the collegial atmosphere for conducting business at the OPCW and assuage those delegations critical of the way in which the final report was negotiated. In a worst-case scenario, if left to fester, such ill feeling could lead disaffected members to question the legitimacy and standing of the final report. In the longer term, the OPCW needs to prepare for what could be even more difficult negotiations regarding destruction deadlines before 2012 and at the Third Review Conference in 2013.

Perhaps most importantly, the conference was not able to show in its final report that CWC states parties have come to grips effectively with the impending shift in the OPCW’s mission as destruction gives way to nonproliferation. The report by the Technical Secretariat said that the OPCW will shift from being “mainly a disarmament organization to being primarily a nonproliferation organization.” [31] It will therefore have to dedicate particular attention to matters such as the non re-emergence of chemical weapons, monitoring developments in industry and science, and compliance with the treaty provisions on the transfer of chemical weapons and on not assisting in acquiring them. Some participants expected this “gradual shift” to be discussed at the RevCon. Given the proximity of the 2012 final deadline and the fact that destruction activities in Russia and the United States are likely to continue beyond 2012, however, many states parties, particularly from the NAM, felt that there was little need to pay attention to this shift at the RevCon. As already mentioned, some NAM states parties object to the notion of the CWC as a “nonproliferation” treaty, while others think that discussion can wait until a later date. However, such a fundamental shift requires careful preparation on the part of states parties and the Technical Secretariat; as the Director-General stated, the OPCW should be “fully aware, and at an early stage” of this shift. [32]

The possibility of failure caused some participants to ask what would have happened had the conference failed to adopt a final report. The CWC differs significantly from the BWC and NPT for which periodic RevCons are the only institutional mechanisms by which states parties can raise important strategic, long-term questions. [33] These treaties rely on their RevCons for the evolution of norms, rules and procedures. In contrast, the CWC benefits from policy-making organs that meet regularly and can adapt procedures to changing circumstances. Even if the conference had ended in failure, the OPCW would continue to exist, its regular meetings would still convene, and inspectors would still carry out their work. In theory, CWC RevCons should therefore play a different role, more focused on strategy, long-term thinking, and the normative foundations of the CWC. In practice however, it seems difficult to avoid “contaminating” the RevCons with day-to-day implementation issues.

Perhaps one way to achieve a shift in focus would be to open the CWC up to external influences and to broaden the scope of its agenda. The RevCon highlighted the degree to which the OPCW operates in isolation from other treaties, even those closely related to it, such as the BWC, and the way in which many states parties refuse to allow mention of anything not specifically mandated by the CWC. For example, the final document from the 2007 Sixth BWC RevCon mentions UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR)1540 twice. In contrast, opposition by Iran to mentioning UNSCR 1540 in the Second CWC RevCon final report was intense enough that it was replaced with a generic reference to “the resolutions of the United Nations on combating terrorism.” Similarly, whereas the BWC document mentions the UN Secretary-General’s investigative mechanism and its recent technical update, no mention of it is made at all in the CWC report, despite the OPCW having been involved in the updating process. Interaction with other international organizations and civil society during the RevCon was also less than at similar gatherings elsewhere. International organizations and NGOs were not given the chance to address the RevCon directly, as they can, for example, at BWC meetings. However, the report did contain provisions that could provide an important foundation in three key areas: the role of the OPCW in countering terrorism; safety and security at chemical plants; and cooperation with stakeholders. Action in each of these areas will inevitably involve interactions with outside agencies and a broader understanding of the role of the OPCW.

For everyone who expected the Second RevCon to be a low-key affair, the events of April 7-18 came as a surprise. Nothing can be taken for granted in disarmament diplomacy, and it is now clear that a lot of work remains to achieve the OPCW’s goal of a world free of chemical weapons.

Daniel Feakes – University of Sussex