The conclusion of the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) did little to resolve a number of questions about the status of and prospects for the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons (ACW) left by Japanese forces in China after World War II. Under the convention, Japan is responsible for the disposal of over 350,000 CW munitions estimated to be in numerous (and mostly unexcavated) ACW sites in China. [1] The original treaty-designated timeline for destruction required Japan to have completed elimination of all ACW prior to April 2007 – ten years after the CWC’s entry into force. Due to political and technological complications, however, the Japanese government was granted a five year extension. A number of analysts remain concerned that even the extended 2012 deadline will be difficult for Japan to meet, particularly as the exact locations of the vast majority of abandoned munitions in China remain unclear. Although Japanese and Chinese officials both appear optimistic that the deadline will be met, a number of recent developments cast a further cloud over progress to that goal.

Few Steps Forward, Few Steps Back
In April 2007, China and Japan reached a final agreement on the primary ACW destruction site. The facility – called the Japan-China Joint Organization for the Destruction of Japanese ACWs in China – is located in Haerbaling, an administrative section of Dunhua City in China’s northeastern Jilin Province. The agreement on this facility and the establishment of the Japan-China Joint Organization was seen as an important step in the progress of the destruction program as it finally created a practical framework for beginning the disposal work. The facility is intended to dispose of 330,000 ACW munitions. According to joint estimates, approximately 90 percent of the ACW munitions in China are in Jilin Province. [2] In the summer of 2007 Japan and China further agreed to allow the use of a mobile destruction facility for disposal of munitions that cannot be safely transported to Haerbaling. Given that the condition of many of the ACW munitions is deteriorating, the utilization of a mobile facility is essential for public safety reasons as well as for the successful completion of the destruction project. The first location of the mobile facility will be in Nanjing, in China’s Jiangsu Province. [3]

Despite these steps forward, progress on destruction has been sluggish. Since the CWC came into force in April 1997, China and Japan have signed numerous agreements related to the disposal of the abandoned munitions, but no disposal has actually occurred. As one Chinese official recently noted, despite a decade of talks and agreements, the Japanese government has yet to clean up even one chemical weapons site, even though numerous advances in the excavation of chemical weapons have been achieved. [4]

In a 2003 interview with Oriental Outlook magazine, a Japanese government official claimed that the slow pace of the Sino-Japanese negotiations was due to the unprecedented nature of the clean-up work, arguing, “So many chemical weapons were dumped in the soil for such a long time. Nothing similar has happened in any other countries in the world. If there were precedents we could acquire some experience. Furthermore, the components of Japanese chemical weapons are different from those of American and Russian ones. In view of this, pioneering work has to be done in the research of technologies for destruction.” [5]

An Embarrassing Scandal
The slow pace of CW disposal has been complicated further by a scandal that surfaced in the fall of 2007 related to the Japanese company contracted to carry out the ACW clean-up. In October 2007, Japanese authorities raided the headquarters of the Abandoned Chemical Weapons Disposal Corporation (ACWDC) on suspicion that the firm and its parent company – Pacific Consultants International (PCI) – misused public funds. In 2004, ACWDC had been given a contract of just under ¥8 billion (approximately US$74 million, based on 2004 exchange rates) to be the sole firm responsible for carrying out destruction of the ACW. The company and its parent, however, are accused of skimming funds by padding bills sent to the Japanese government through the inclusion of “expenses” for the work of phony subcontractors. [6]

The contract for the disposal project was awarded to ACWDC without a public bidding process, and PCI former president Tamio Araki, who has been indicted along with a number of other PCI executives, reportedly claimed that the contracts were awarded solely to ACWDC because of his strong personal contacts with the government. As a reward for securing the contracts, Araki demanded that PCI funnel ¥300 million to Pacific Program Management, PCI’s group company, of which Araki was then president. [7]
In March 2008, as more indictments loomed, ACWDC and PCI officially withdrew from the ACW disposal contract. [8] The Cabinet Office then held open bids for the project for fiscal year 2008. [9] State Minister Fumio Kishida, who is responsible for the project, claimed that the government was “trying to make the project more rational and acceptable for the public.” [10]

The Japanese government, however, has not yet commented on the failure of oversight that enabled ACWDC to misappropriate funds. An official of the Cabinet Office defended the decision to sign a discretionary contract with ACWDC, arguing, “Because it is difficult for the government to directly procure, maintain and control the facilities to excavate and store weapons and to incinerate chemicals found in the weapons, we judged it necessary to deal with a corporation that would manage the work in an integrated manner.” However, members of the opposition party criticized the way in which the contracts were awarded; one opposition member stated, “It’s obvious that this type of discretionary contracting leads to corruption.” [11]

The Japanese and international media have raised significant questions about the way in which the Japanese government awarded and oversaw the contract to ACWDC. [12] One commentary from the Japanese daily, Asahi Shimbun, heavily critiques Japanese government action in this case noting that: “What is hard to fathom is why the Cabinet Office awarded such an important project to the company without open bidding. The project had the potential to affect Japan’s diplomatic relations with China if anything went wrong.” [13] Pointing to PCI’s past problems, including an earlier accusation of misusing public funds, the commentary goes on to say that “the Cabinet Office ignored PCI’s blemished reputation and left the project entirely to the company because that was the easiest option.” [14] A May 8, 2008 Yomiuri Shimbun news item focused on the government’s decision to rely on a mechanized approach for disposal work despite advice from experts that a manual approach would be safer and more cost-effective, indicating the misappropriation of funds was not the only reason for the sluggish and expensive nature of the cleanup.

A March 31, 2008 article in Time magazine also discussed the support drawn by both the ruling Japanese political party and its opposition from organizations that downplay or deny Japanese use of chemical or biological weapons against China. The implicit suggestion in the article was that the ACWDC scandal may serve as an excuse for the Japanese government to further delay a process to which it has not been fully committed. [15]

Beijing’s reaction to the controversy over ACWDC and PCI has been relatively muted. Soon after the story broke in October 2007, one of China’s Foreign Ministry spokespersons stated that “China hopes the incident will not affect the disposal of chemicals weapons abandoned by Japan in China and Japan can resolve the issue in a responsible attitude at an early date.” [16] Beijing’s low-key reaction is likely a response to assurances given to China by Japanese officials that the scandal will not affect the progress of ACW destruction. [17]

Despite the problems with ACWDC, work on the destruction program has continued and construction of the facility at Haerbaling is on-going, with much of the infrastructure work being carried out by local contractors. It remains unclear, however, what other Japanese companies will be prepared to take over the contract, leaving the long-term effort in doubt. [18] Beijing’s current acceptance of Tokyo’s assurances may change if a new firm is not identified soon or if the progress of the disposal program is otherwise slowed.

Questions about Waste and Disposal Technology
Environmental and public safety concerns have also slowed progress toward establishing the disposal facility and beginning destruction. Because of the dangerous nature of the ACW materials and the precautionary measures that must be employed when disposing of them, Japanese and Chinese officials have had to consult continuously on the best methods for the proper disposal of the various components of the ACW shells. This thorough consultation process inevitably prolonged the initiation of disposal activities. Although many of the outstanding issues related to environmental safety were resolved in the two 2007 agreements, the two sides have yet to agree on the important questions of how to deal with the waste caused by disposal and how to handle the soil and other materials contaminated by the ACW. The CWC does not clearly specify who should be responsible for the clean-up of disposal waste, and previous agreements between China and Japan have not directly addressed the issue. This unanswered question, then, could still be a sticking point for the ultimate completion of the disposal program. But it is not expected to cause a significant delay, at least in the short-term. [19]

Past disagreements between Japanese and Chinese officials on preferred technologies for disposal also slowed the onset of ACW destruction. Recent agreements, however, appear to have resolved most outstanding issues. In November 2007 Beijing and Tokyo reached an understanding on the major technological requirements of the ACW destruction facilities. In March 2008, however, Japan requested that a number of changes be made to the agreement regarding the requirements for the treatment facility, specifically the removal of a red munitions treatment building from the site plan and the cancellation of plans to use water jet technology used to cut open red shells. [20] “Red munitions” contain diphenylchloroarsine or diphenylcyanoarsine. As noted recently by one analyst, the ACW in China are primarily “red munitions” or “yellow munitions”, which contain a mixture of lewisite and sulfur mustard. [21] China responded positively to Japan’s March 2008 request but stressed that Japan must decide on and stick with technologies that will ensure timely destruction of the munitions. [22]

Cautious Optimism that the 2012 Deadline is Attainable
Despite the difficulty of past negotiations and a number of outstanding issues to be resolved, the disposal deadline still appears attainable, provided the Japanese government can identify a viable replacement to ACWDC and begin disposal on schedule. The creation of the Japan-China Joint Organization has been viewed by those most directly involved as a particularly positive step that will help maintain the momentum for uninterrupted continuation of the destruction program. [23] The next year will be critical – the facility at Haerbaling and the agreed mobile facilities must move forward. The timeline remains tight, however, and any number of political or technical factors can still cause significant problems, delaying completion of disposal well beyond the 2012 deadline.

Shari Oliver and Stephanie Lieggi – Monterey Institute James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies with Amanda Moodie, Independent Consultant