On April 15, 2007, the Russian Navy celebrated the launching of its first strategic submarine in 17 years. The submarine is reported to be 82 percent complete and could enter service in 2008 or 2009. [1] Named the Yuri Dolgoruki after the Slavic prince who founded Moscow in the 12th century, it is the first project-955 Borey-class strategic submarine in a series that could include seven by 2015. Two more Borey-class submarines are already under construction. [2] According to the Russian Navy’s commander-in-chief Vladimir Masorin, the construction schedule provides for completion of one new Borey submarine each year beginning in 2008. [3]

Successes in construction of a new-generation strategic, ballistic missile-launching submarine have been tempered by the failure to develop a new missile for Borey-class submarines. Originally, the Yuri Dolgoruki, whose keel was laid in 1996, was set to carry the modified RSM-52 Bark (SS-N-20 Sturgeon by NATO classification) submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM); however that program was scrapped after three unsuccessful tests. [4] The project to develop a new missile was renamed the Bulava-30 (SS-NX-30) and awarded to the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology, the design company famous for developing the land-based Topol and Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). The Yuri Dolgoruki is set to carry 12 Bulava missiles, each capable of carrying 6-10 independently-maneuverable nuclear warheads, while subsequent Borey-class ships will carry 16 such missiles. [5]

Like Bark, Bulava already has experienced three failures; however, canceling it is not an option because the Navy cannot afford to begin a third SLBM program. As a result, testing must continue. According to Russian officials, the next Bulava flight test will take place in June 2007. [6] Anatoly Perminov, the head of Roskosmos, which is responsible for the creation of defense missile technology, explained that deployment of Bulava missiles might require a minimum of 12-14 test launches. He expressed confidence in the success of the program, however. “We know where the ‘sick places’ were,” he said, “and we hope that we have cured them.” [7] Vladimir Dvorkin, the former director of the Defense Ministry’s Fourth Central Research Institute, also echoed these sentiments. [8]

Seeking to explain the recent failures in the Bulava program, Yuri Solomonov, director of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology and developer of the Bulava, noted that development had essentially started from scratch. [9] Given the high degree of novelty in Bulava’s design, the engineers cannot borrow similar design elements from earlier missiles. In order to reduce costs, the developers are conducting ground-based tests to determine the causes of Bulava’s failures, which appear to have occurred within several thousandths of a second. Asked whether the recent failures will change the plans for Bulava’s deployment, Solomonov replied: “Our plans have not changed. We are planning to complete flight tests of Bulava according to schedule, and I am absolutely certain that these tests will be completed with favorable results.” He also said that tests had confirmed “the capability of the overwhelming majority of the elements of the missile’s design to work properly.” Based on their analysis of earlier tests, Bulava’s manufacturers apparently agreed to serial production of the missile’s components, according to plans laid out in the government’s defense armament strategy. [10]

Although there is little doubt that the Borey-Bulava program will continue, the missile test scheduled for the summer of 2007 may be crucial for the future of Russia’s entire strategic posture. In the summer of 2000, during the first year of his tenure, Vladimir Putin made the decision to allocate significant resources for modernization of the sea-based leg of the country’s strategic triad, to a large extent at the expense of the land-based leg, which during the Soviet era had traditionally received priority when resources were allocated for strategic systems. Indeed, since the summer 2000 decision, production of land-based strategic missiles has remained at very low levels.

Thus, the crash program to build new submarines and SLBMs has approached the “moment of truth”–the success or failure of efforts to introduce quickly a new generation of strategic submarines will define the face of the Russian triad for years to come.


Jacob Quamme – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies