INDIA'S MISSILE PROGRAM: DIVERGING TRAJECTORIES
February 2007 Issue
 

For both strategic and commercial reasons, India continues its wide-ranging pursuit of ballistic and cruise missile capabilities. India recently inducted the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, the product of an Indian-Russian joint venture, into its armed forces. However, the smooth progress of the BrahMos effort has been marred by dissatisfaction among those Russian defense companies that have not been allowed to participate in the program. Meanwhile, New Delhi has struggled to overcome setbacks in its long-range ballistic missile project, and it is likely to conduct additional tests of this system in 2007.

The BrahMos Dispute
In December 2006, reports in the official Russian news agency
Itar-Tass accused BrahMos Aerospace Ltd. (the joint Indian-Russian manufacturer of the BrahMos) of trying to shut similar missiles out of the market, such as the Moskit, produced by the Russian state-owned defense giant Rosoboronexport. [1] Analysts, including those from Russia, suggested that Rosoboronexport was likely behind the allegation. They noted that BrahMos is the only missile Russia has developed or co-developed that Rosoboronexport does not market, implying that it will not receive profits from sales of the system. [2]

BrahMos Aerospace responded to these charges by stating that New Delhi has placed orders with several Russian enterprises to supply 100 ground- and submarine-launched Club cruise missiles to the Indian Army and Navy. [3] BrahMos CEO A.S. Pillai acknowledged the Russian complaint that India is replacing Russian-made Club anti-ship missiles with the BrahMos on Indian surface ships, but also stated that the success of BrahMos missiles on Russian-built Krivak class Indian naval frigates had led India to place further orders for these ships from Russia, more than compensating for the reduced Club sales. [4] BrahMos Aerospace did not directly address the allegation that the BrahMos missile will be marketed against competing Russian missiles, but did state that its marketing of the system to other countries was being undertaken with the approval and support of their Russian joint venture partners. [5]

In recent months, India has conducted negotiations to sell the missile to a number of countries, including Brazil, Chile, Kuwait, Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Africa. [6] In doing so, India and Russia have sought to adhere to the guidelines of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) by ensuring that the anti-ship cruise missile is limited to a range of 290 kilometers (km) and a payload of 200-300 kilograms (kg). [7] This combination of range and payload means that the BrahMos would not be treated as a “Category I” system under the MTCR and therefore would not be covered by its most restrictive export control rules. MTCR Category I systems are those having a range equal to or exceeding 300 km while carrying a payload of 500 kg; under the MTCR, export licenses for these missiles are subject to a “presumption of denial” in member states. [8] However, because the BrahMos appears capable of flying to a range equal to or exceeding 300 km with a lighter payload, it would likely be subject to the MTCR’s Category II requirements (specifically to Item 19 of the regime’s Technical Annex), which mandate that the exporter obtain end-use assurances from the recipient that the missile will not be used to deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD). [9] None of the potential customers for the BrahMos mentioned above are alleged to possess WMD. This attention to the MTCR is consistent with recent steps India has taken to conform its export control regulations to the standards of the regime. [10]

Notwithstanding the BrahMos controversy, overall defense ties between Russia and India have remained unaffected for now, as seen in the cordial welcome given Russian President Vladimir Putin during his January 25-26, 2007, visit to New Delhi. In recent weeks, senior officials from both sides have discussed plans for further transactions, including Indian purchases of Russian T-90 tanks and the emergency purchase of 30 to 40 Sukhoi-30MKI jets. [11] In addition, in an arrangement similar to that which produced the BrahMos, the Indian state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) and the Russian Irkut Corporation announced plans to jointly develop and manufacture a 60-ton multi-role transport aircraft. [12]

While seeking to export BrahMos to friendly countries, New Delhi continues to seek advanced cruise missile technology from a number of states, including France. In September 2006, during the visit of Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee to Paris, the French government agreed in principle to provide such
technology to India, but no agreement was concluded at the time, and neither side revealed the capabilities or the specific technology under discussion. [13] It has been speculated that since India’s cruise missiles can already strike targets almost 300 km distant, the technology sought from France was intended to allow India to develop systems with greater range, although such a sale, depending on the details, might contravene France’s obligations under the MTCR guidelines. [14] At the time of writing, there is no firm indication that the deal between France and India has been consummated.

The Indian Army plans to deploy a land-attack version of the BrahMos by late 2007, and an air-launched variant will be deployed by the Air Force on India’s Sukhoi-30 MKI aircraft by 2009. [15] In addition, press reports indicate that New Delhi hopes eventually to deploy nuclear tipped land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) with a range of more than 1,500 km. [16] However, it is unlikely that these long-range LACMs will be based on the BrahMos platform since the missile’s liquid-fuel ramjet engine will not support such an extended range. [17]

The Agni III Test and Other Missile
Developments Indian defense scientists have stated that the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), India’s top defense research agency, is likely to conduct a second test of the 3,000- 4,000-km-range Agni III ballistic missile in January or February 2007. [18] The first test of this missile, in July 2006, failed after the missile fell into the sea without reaching its intended target. (See “India’s Agni III Test Makes Few Waves Abroad, More at Home,” WMD Insights,
September 2006.) According to Indian press reports, citing sources in the DRDO, the design tested in July 2006 suffered from serious flaws, and major components of the system, including the staging and re-entry vehicle, have not been validated. [19] Moreover, these reports suggest that even after these flaws are rectified, at least three to four tests will be required before production could be considered.

The proposed Agni III test will come at a time when the DRDO faces increasing criticism over continual delays and/or failures to deliver on several other ambitious projects, including two surface-to-air missile systems, the Akash (25 km) and Trishul (9 km). [20] A Parliamentary defense committee recently criticized the DRDO for its lack of financial accountability and weak auditing practices in managing these troubled projects. [21] Reports have stated that the Akash missile project is on the verge of being scrapped after a series of failed tests. [22] In its place, the Air Force has ordered the Israeli Spyder system. The Trishul system, which has been downgraded to a “technology demonstrator” and given a one-year extension to assess technologies for potential use in other programs, has also been effectively disbanded. [23] One missile system that has been inducted, the Prithvi I, a 150-km-range land-based ballistic missile, also suffers from serious operational problems. Prithvi’s accuracy has been questioned, and there are reports that the Indian Army was forced to deploy it prematurely. Meanwhile, the Agni I and II have apparently not undergone sufficient testing to permit deployment. [24]

In the midst of these setbacks, the DRDO successfully tested a ballistic missile defense system in November 2006. An unnamed interceptor missile was able to strike a Prithvi II missile
(250-km-range, deployed by the Indian Air Force), over the Bay of Bengal. [25] The DRDO plans to produce anti-missile systems that can destroy missiles both outside the earth’s atmosphere and near the earth’s surface. [26]

Conclusion
The development of future variants of cruise missiles, as well as expected tests of the Agni III, will help determine the structure of India’s minimum nuclear deterrence posture. India’s cruise missile program has experienced recent success, but its faltering ballistic missile program has come under criticism, creating uncertainty as to the role it will eventually play in India’s strategic planning. [27] Meanwhile, depending on the capabilities of the systems New Delhi markets to others, India’s missile exports could either reinforce the norms of the MTCR or pose new missile proliferation challenges.

Sharad Joshi – Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies






SOURCES AND NOTES
[1] Vladimir Radyuhin, “Row over BrahMos,” Hindu, December 18, 2006, http://www.thehindu.com/2006/12/18/stories/2006121806511200.htm. [View Article] Russian sources claim that although BrahMos is considered an Indian missile, “several hundred” key components are produced in Russia and shipped to India for final assembly. Nikita Petrov, “Tankovaya Armada Idet na Vostok” [The Tank Army Goes East], Strana.Ru, December 26, 2006. The name “BrahMos” is derived from the names of two rivers, the Indian Brahmaputra River and the Russian Moskva River.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Vinay Shukla, “Indian Arms Chief Attacks Russian Takeover Bid,” Press Trust of India, December 17, 2006, OSC document SAP20061217950019.
[4] Ibid. In 2006, India placed orders for three Talwar-class (Krivak-3) frigates through Rosoboronexport, which are likely to carry BrahMos anti-ship missiles and not the Club-N which were fitted to the three previous Talwar-class frigates delivered to India in 2003-04. See, Henry Ivanov, “Yards Selected for Indian Frigate Programme,” Jane’s Navy International, March 1, 2006. BrahMos Aerospace is preparing a submarine-launched variant of the BrahMos, which will be installed on India’s Russian Amur 1650 diesel submarines. See Rajat Pandit, “India, Russia May Export 1,000 BrahMos,” Times of India, January 24, 2007, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India_Russia_may_export_1000_BrahMos/articleshow/1410581.cms.
[View Article] This could reduce the prospects for future purchases of the Club for use on Indian submarines.
[5] Radyuhin, “Row over BrahMos…”; Jon Grevatt, “BrahMos Denies Reports of Russian Concern Over Missile Sale,” Jane’s Defence Industry, February 1, 2007.
[6] “Russia Objects to India Plans to Sell BrahMos Missiles,” The Daily Times (Pakistan), January 10, 2007, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007\01\10\story_10-1-2007_pg7_39; [View Article] Ranjit Kumar, “Brazil Interested in BrahMos Missile,” The Navbharat Times, December 2, 2006, OSC document SAP20061202414005.
[7] “India Test-fires ‘BrahMos’ Cruise Missile,” People’s Daily, February 13, 2003, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200302/13/eng20030213_111564.shtml. [View Article]
[8] MTCR website, www.mtcr.info/english/index.html. [View Article] See also, “The Missile Technology Control Regime at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, Fact Sheet, September 2004, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mtcr.asp.
[View Article] A prominent Pakistani arms control and disarmament expert, Naeem Ahmad Salik, has argued that the range and payload combination of BrahMos makes a “mockery” of MTCR regulations and that in his view it is not possible to verify the range of the missile. See Naeem Ahmad Salik, “Pakistan’s Missile Development: Priorities, Challenges, Myths and Reality,” Strategic Studies, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Spring 2002, Vol. XXII, No. 1, http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2002_files/no_1/article/7a.htm. [View Article]
[9] See “Missile Technology Control Regime,” Arms Control Association, http://www.armscontrol.org/documents/mtcr.asp,
[View Article] Item 19; Category II of the MTCR covers rocket systems (including ballistic missiles), and unmanned air vehicles (including cruise missile systems) which are capable of reaching a maximum range of at least 300 km. Presumably, Russia obtained such assurances from India before transferring BrahMos production technology to it.
[10] Sharon Squassoni, “U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report, November 22, 2006, pp. 3-4, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33016.pdf; [View Article] “India in a Position to Export Missiles: Indian Defense Minister,” IRNA News report, GlobalSecurity.org, May 12, 2005, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/india/2005/india-050512-irna02.htm. [View Article]
[11] “Putin’s India Visit: Of T-90 Tanks, Frigates, & SU-30 Jets,” Rediff.com, January 19, 2007, http://www.rediff.com///news/2007/jan/19arms.htm. [View Article] The contract on T-90s may already have been signed. See Nikita Petrov, “Tankovaya Armada Idet na Vostok” [The Tank Army Goes East], Strana.Ru, December 26, 2006.
[12] “HAL and Irkut’s Joint Tactical Transport Project,” January 15, 2007, http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/2007/01/hal-and-irkuts-joint-tactical-transport-project/index.php. [View Article]
[13] Saroj Nagi, “India Wants ‘Moving Fast,’ France Favors ‘Step by Step’ on Missile Technology,” Hindustan Times, September 6, 2006, OSC document SAP20060906384008.
[14] Ibid. Furthermore, according to Dennis M. Gormley, Senior Fellow, Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, another option for India as it seeks to develop an extended range cruise missile would be to acquire turbofan engines or technology from Russia, although Russia, like France, applies the MTCR rules, which might ban such a transfer. For increasing stealth capabilities, New Delhi might seek to acquire a French cruise missile, such as a variant of the Apache.
[15] “India, Russia to Produce 1000 BrahMos Cruise Missiles by 2016,” India-Defence.com, October 27, 2006, http://www.india-defence.com/reports/2635; Rajat Pandit, “India-made BrahMos to Hit Global Arms Market,” Times of India, January 3, 2007, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India-made_BrahMos_to_hit_global_market/articleshow/1027677.cms.
[View Article]
[16] Ibid.
[17] Thanks to Dennis M. Gormley, for insight on this issue. He also notes that a longer-range cruise missile would use a turbofan engine and fly at a subsonic speed, as opposed to the BrahMos’ supersonic speed.
[18] A.K. Dhar, “Agni-3 to Get a Second Chance in 2007,” Rediff.com, December 28, 2007, http://www.rediff.com///news/2006/dec/28agni.htm. [View Article]
[19] Sandeep Dikshit, “Design Flaw Behind Agni-III Failure: Force,” The Hindu, August 7, 2006, http://www.hindu.com/2006/08/07/stories/2006080704351200.htm. [View Article]
[20] “Government Denies Winding up Trishul Missile Project,” Times of India, November 29, 2006, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/NEWS/India/Govt_denies_winding_up_Trishul_missile_project/articleshow/636092.cms;
[View Article] See also “R&D Work on Trishul Missile to be Stopped,” The Hindu, October 15, 2006, http://www.hindu.com/2006/10/15/stories/2006101502771000.htm. [View Article]
[21] Amitav Ranjan and Shiv Aroor, “DRDO Opposes It But House Panel Underlines: You Need Outside Audit,” Indian Express, December 28, 2006, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/19516.html. [View Article]
[22] “India to Test Longer Range Ballistic Missile in 2007,” SpaceWar.com, November 9, 2006, http://www.spacewar.com/reports/India_To_Test_Longer_Range_Ballistic_Missile_In_2007_999.html. [View Article]
[23] Shiv Aroor, “DRDO Gets a Year to ‘Wrap Up’ Trishul Project,” Indian Express, October 18, 2006, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/14879.html. [View Article]
[24] Shiv Aroor and Amitav Ranjan, “Armed Forces Wait as Showpiece Missiles are Unguided, Way Off Mark,” Indian Express, November 13, 2006, http://www.indianexpress.com/story/16521.html. [View Article] There is some dispute in the unclassified literature as to whether the Agni I and Agni II have been inducted. See e.g., National Air and Space Intelligence Center, “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat,” March 2006, http://www.nukestrat.com/us/afn/NASIC2006.pdf, [View Article] (Agni I and II not deployed) and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “Indian Nuclear Forces 2006,” http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/India.pdf, [View Article] (Agni I and II inducted in 2004).
[25] “Missile Testfire With a ‘Mystery’ Twist,” The Telegraph, November 28, 2006, http://www.telegraphindia.com/1061128/asp/nation/story_7060324.asp; [View Article] for a comprehensive analysis see Raj Chengappa, “The New Guardian,” India Today, December 12, 2006, OSC document SAP20061207342006.
[26] Sandeep Dikshit, “India Developing New Missiles Towards Destroying Hostile Missiles,” The Hindu, December 3, 2006, http://www.thehindu.com/2006/12/03/stories/2006120312940100.htm. [View Article]
[27] For a discussion of this issue see Pravin Sawhney, “India urged to ‘Urgently’ Define Ballistic, Cruise Missile Policy,” Force (New Delhi), September 9, 2005, OSC document SAP20050909000102.